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INTRODUCION
That the US Constitution establishes a single executive is incon-
trovertible as a historical matter;' a plural executive was debated and
rejected.2 As a matter of constitutional theory and institutional design,
however, this conclusion is far from inevitable and likely incorrect. The
convention era debates about single versus plural executives exhibited
fundamental confusion about the relationship between numerosity in
the executive, the structure of executive authority, and core democratic
values like accountability, coordination, and uniformity. This confusion is
understandable given the extraordinary pedigree of single executives in
constitutional theory, including but not limited to Locke,3 Blackstone,
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1 US Const Art II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.") (emphasis added).
2 For example, Eldridge Gerry favored annexing a council to the executive. In general,
participants in the Federal Convention were concerned that a single executive would trend
towards monarchy but that a plural executive would lack sufficient energy and authority. See
Records of the Federal Convention, in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds, 3 The Founders'
Constitution 491-95 (Chicago 1987).
3 See John Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government § 144 at 72 (Blackwell 1946) (J.W.
Gough, ed). See also Oliver Ellsworth, The Landholder, VI, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed, Essays on
the Constitution 161, 163 (Historical Printing 1892) ("[Tjhe supreme executive should be one
person, and unfettered otherwise than by the laws he is to execute.").
4 See William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England *24243 (Chicago 1979).
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Hamilton,' and Montesquieu, and the historical fact that most plural
executive regimes were ineffectual councils. But the conventional jus-
tifications for rejecting plural executives are powerful weapons
against only some very specific forms of plural executive regimes. Un-
fortunately, this early confusion has been replicated over and over in
more recent debates about the unitary executive and the scope of ex-
ecutive authority.
This Article articulates and analyzes the possibility of what we call
the unbundled executive. The unbundled executive is a plural execu-
tive regime in which discrete authority is taken from the president and
given exclusively to a directly elected executive official. Imagine a
directly elected war executive, education executive, or agriculture ex-
ecutive. We show that a partially unbundled executive is likely to per-
form better than the completely bundled executive structure attendant
in the single executive regime. By better, we mean that the standard
arguments used to justify a single strong unitary executive in the Unit-
ed States -accountability, energy, uniformity, coordination, and so on -
actually justify a specific type of plural executive, not the single execu-
tive structure favored in Article II. Our thesis then is both unusual and
controversial in that there has been virtually no serious theoretical
challenge to the single executive structure for more than a century.
The entire unitary executive debate assumes a cornerstone that we
suggest is incorrect and consequential.
The unbundled executive proposal has an air of absurdity to it
with respect to federal law, but this basic structure is an existing fea-
ture of legions of state and local governments in the United States.
Most states directly elect state attorneys general-as well as numerous
other executive officers'-and dividing executive authority does not
usually produce any of the pathologies that critics of divided execu-
tives suggest.8 Prohibiting an executive from appointing cabinet mem-
5 See Federalist 70 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 471, 471 (Wesleyan 1961) (J.E. Cooke,
ed) (arguing that the energy in a single executive is critical for security and steady implementa-
tion of laws).
6 See Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 156 (Hafner 1949) (Thomas Nugent,
trans) ("The executive power ought to be in the hands of a monarch, because this branch of
government, having need of despatch, is better administered by one than by many.").
7 See William N. Thompson, Should We Elect or Appoint State Government Executives?
Some New Data Concerning State Attorneys General, 8 Midwest Rev Pub Admin 17, 17 (1974)
(noting that attorneys general are elected in forty-two states and that many other state-level
executives are elected).
8 See, for example, Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws at 156 (cited in note 6). See also
William P Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors; State Attorneys General, and Lessons
from the Divided Executive, 115 Yale L J 2446, 2453-55 (2006) (discussing interaction between
elected attorneys generals and governors and observing that "debilitating conflict" does not
occur). Marshall's work is probably the closest to our own.
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bers connotes a debilitating lack of coordination and efficiency. Yet,
most state and local governments, whatever their faults, do not appear
to be debilitated in this way. In reality, the closest empirical approxi-
mations to the unbundled executive in state and local governments
seem to produce systematic shifts in public policy outcomes towards
public preferences.' Unbundling executive authority enhances demo-
cratic accountability and government performance; the plural execu-
tive regime does not cease to function.
This empirical regularity that unbundled executives produce po-
litical outcomes closer to public preferences has a natural and intui-
tive foundation in legal theory. An unbundled executive systematically
reduces agency problems in representative government by enhancing
accountability to national citizen constituencies. Unbundling executive
authority reduces the risk of nonuniform implementation of federal
law. And the unbundled executive would be as energetic and strong as
a bundled executive. Put simply, the unbundled executive performs
better along the very dimensions that are typically used to justify the
single, strong, unitary executive structure that Article II articulates;"
that is, the unbundled executive outperforms the single unitary execu-
tive on its own turf.
Unbundling government authority does, however, also generate
concrete costs, which we identify and discuss. We show how and why
there can be too much unbundling of government authority. These
costs, however, must be traded off against the gains in executive per-
formance that our system would generate. While we think it implausi-
ble that executive authority should be entirely unbundled such that
hundreds of executives would be directly elected, it is nearly as im-
plausible that a sinle pcrfcctly bundled executive represents the op-
timal executive structure. Given that this is, in fact, the current regime,
some rethinking of executive authority is surely in order.
Modem legal theory is replete with detailed and careful analysis of
the costs and benefits of centralizing or fragmenting authority across
branches. The dispersion of power among the branches of government
is a key organizing principle sounded loudly in the Federalist Papers,"
which also echoes throughout both more ancient and more modem
9 See Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institu-
tions, 52 J L & Econ (forthcoming 2009).
10 See Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 580-81 (2004) (Thomas dissenting) ("The Founders
intended that the President have primary responsibility-along with the necessary power-to
protect the national security and to conduct the Nation's foreign relations. They did so principal-
ly because the structural advantages of a unitary Executive are essential in these domains.");
Clinton v Jones, 520 US 681,712-13 (1997) (Breyer concurring) (explaining that Article II seeks
to focus all executive responsibility in a single person).
11 See, for example, Federalist 48 (Madison), in The Federalist 332,335 (cited in note 5).
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constitutional theory.'2 There is, however, a comparative dearth of scho-
larship analyzing the internal allocation of authority within branches,'3
particularly the executive branch." This is unfortunate given that the
internal structure of power within branches is likely to produce im-
pacts on democratic governance that are at least as severe as cross-
branch distributions.
To the extent that this theoretical space has been occupied at all
in recent years, it has been largely the unitary executive debate that
occupied this terrain." Many pages in the law reviews and Supreme
Court reporters have been filled with fights over what the Constitu-
tion permits and requires on this front;" must the president have
strong, weak, or complete hierarchical control over all administrative
officials?'7 What is the permissible structure that Congress may estab-
12 Compare Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws at 152 (cited in note 6) ("There would be an
end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of the people,
to exercise those three powers, [that of the legislature,] that of executing the public resolutions,
and of trying the causes of individuals."), with Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of
Separation of Powers, 1991 S Ct Rev 225, 236 ("The substantive interpretation of the constitu-
tional principle of separation of powers would reduce to a single, simple rule: Congress may not
create a Fourth Branch of the federal government.").
13 There is, of course, a significant literature on the allocation of authority within the US
Congress. See generally Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast, Positive Theories of Congressional
Institutions (Michigan 1995).
14 This idea is related to (but also distinct from) recent work emphasizing internal separa-
tion of powers as an organizing principle for the executive. See Neil Katyal, Internal Separation
of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 Yale L J 2314, 2318 (2006)
(arguing that separation of authority within executive departments could provide a check on the
aggrandizement of arbitrary executive power). There is, of course, no shortage of work on the
importance of bicameralism in this regard. See, for example, Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When
Are Two Decisions Better Than One?, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 145,149 (1992) (clarifying conditions
under which multiple decisions produce superior outcomes in the legislature). See also William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett, Cases and Materials on Legislation 75-77,
383-91 (West 2001).
15 See, for example, Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, and Anthony J. Colangelo,
The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 Iowa L Rev 601, 730-31 (2005); Robert
V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-so-Unitary Executive,
51 Duke L J 963,966 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi and Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitu-
tion: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv L Rev 1153,1208-13 (1992). See also note 10.
16 See, for example, Clinton, 520 US at 711-13 (Breyer concurring) (arguing that the presi-
dent cannot constitutionally delegate "ultimate responsibility or the active obligation to super-
vise that goes with it"); Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 660 (1988) (holding that the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act do not impermissibly interfere with the
separation of powers established by the Constitution); Myers v United States, 272 US 52, 176
(1926) (recounting historical debates over the scope of executive power and concluding that the
president does not have the power to remove inferior officers).
17 See, for example, Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U Chi L Rev 1, 15-16 (1995); Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 S Ct Rev
41, 45; Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government. Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 Colum L Rev 573 (1984).
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lish for relations between the president and administrative officials?18
May Congress restrict the president's ability to remove an officer ap-
pointed by the president? Does the president have the authority to
negate the judgments of any and all administrative officials? 9 Could
the president unilaterally substitute her own judgment for that of any
administrative official?
On one view, independent agencies-those headed by officials who
cannot be removed by the president without good cause-are legally
uncontroversial; on the other, they are an abomination clearly inconsis-
tent with the explicit constitutional structure.' This is a good and im-
portant debate as far as it goes; but as a matter of constitutional possi-
bility, it is meager. Constitutional theory could be a bit more ambitious.
In the remainder of this Article, we articulate and defend our
theory of the unbundled executive. We survey the theoretical debates
about structuring executive authority and show how and why the un-
bundled executive performs better than a single unitary executive.
Although our discussion is mainly conceptual, we draw on empirical
evidence about how unbundled authority affects public policy when-
ever relevant. We clarify the relation between the unbundled execu-
18 Roughly speaking, this debate has two fault lines, one historical and one normative.
There is disagreement about the historical question of whether the Founders intended a strong
unitary executive. Compare Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Pow-
er to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L J 541 (1994) (yes), Calabresi and Rhodes, 105 Harv L Rev at
1191-92 (cited in note 15) (yes), with Lawrence Lessig and Cass R. Sunstein, The President and
the Administration, 94 Colum L Rev 1, 2 (1994) (no). In addition to this historical question, there
is a separate normative question about whether a strong unitary executive is desirable on prag-
matic or consequentionalist grounds. Compare Lessig and Sunstein, 94 Colum L Rev at 2 (desir-
able), with Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L J 1725, 1810-36 (1996)
(undesirable). For variants of the argument that Article II's Vesting Clause settles the question of
plural versus single executive but not the question of strong versus weak hierarchical control, see
Morton Rosenberg, Congress's Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise
and Fall of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 Geo Wash L Rev 627,
634 (1989) (suggesting that the unitary executive theory is a myth generated for political rea-
sons); E. Donald Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 Geo
Wash L Rev 506,529-31 (1989) (arguing that the text of the Constitution does not shed sufficient
light on the issue of a strong versus weak unitary executive); Bruce Ledewitz, The Uncertain
Power of the President to Execute the Laws, 46 Tenn L Rev 757, 762 (1979) (comparing theories
about the hierarchy of congressional and presidential powers).
19 See, for example, Kevin Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws,
106 Colum L Rev 263 (2006) (arguing that the president has no direct authority to administer
laws when Congress grants power to executive officers subject to presidential control unless the
statute grants the authority to the president by name).
20 See Percival, 51 Duke L J at 966 (cited in note 15).
21 Compare Abner Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61
U Chi L Rev 123 (1994) (arguing that the growth of national government makes arguments for a
strongly unitary executive less powerful), Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal,
101 Harv L Rev 421,447 (1987), with Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State,
107 Harv L Rev 1231 (1994).
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tive and both current and historical debates in constitutional law. We
also revisit the relevant debates about plural executive structures. Our
work can, but need not, be read as an attack on many of the pragmatic
justifications for a strong unitary executive. As such, the work is di-
rectly relevant to ongoing disputes about whether Article II should be
interpreted to require a unitary executive structure in addition to a
single executive structure. These questions of numerosity and unitari-
ness have been treated almost identically in the literature; in reality,
they are conceptually distinct.
To be clear at the outset, we are adamantly not arguing that the
Constitution does, in fact, establish a plural unbundled executive re-
gime. But the sky might not fall if it did. Systems of plural or divided
executives have long been ridiculed in constitutional theory. If the
unbundling story is even plausible, there is a significant set of unap-
preciated benefits to some plural executive regimes. Although we es-
timate the probability of institutional reform in the United States to
be approximately zero, it would not be nearly as perverse as it first
appears to design an unbundled executive. If so, taking steps within the
given constitutional order to bring executive authority closer to the
unbundled executive ideal could make for a better fit between institu-
tional performance and constitutional ideals.
I. UNBUNDLING GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY
This Part provides a general conceptual overview of the unbun-
dled executive. We explain the dynamics of unbundling authority in
government, emphasizing the ways in which unbundled authority of-
ten enhances democratic accountability. The link between issue un-
bundling and democratic theory was pioneered by Timothy Besley
and Stephen Coate, who initially argued that the unbundling intuition
explains differences in the performance of elected versus appointed
regulators and the power of citizen initiatives." We then provide some
empirical institutional details about the extent of executive unbun-
dling in state and local governments. Although our goals in this Article
are mainly conceptual rather than empirical, unbundled authority is
consistently associated with meaningful differences in policy outcomes
in state and local government. The degree of unbundling in govern-
ment matters not just in theory, but also in practice.
22 Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and
Evidence, 1 J Eur Econ Assn 1176 (2003); Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, Issue Unbundling
via Citizens' Initiatives (unpublished manuscript, 2000) (suggesting that issue bundling explains
the relevance of direct democracy in a representative system where candidates must already
compete for the right to control policy). We owe an obvious intellectual debt to Besley and
Coate, as we have built upon their work here and elsewhere.
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A. The Unbundled Executive in Theory
One of the obvious defining features of the US Presidency is the
national electoral constituency.3 The institutional design choice to make
the president directly elected rather than selected by the legislature
largely distinguishes the presidential system from the parliamentary
system." Direct electoral accountability to a national constituency is
critical." Indeed, elections are often said to be the cornerstone of con-
stitutional democracy.26
Of course, any idealized view of elections as translating popular
preferences into public policy has long since faltered." Voter ignor-
ance or information asymmetries often undermine the use of elections
to control officials." The very notion of popular will to be translated
into policy by officials is either incoherent" or nonexistent." Public
choice theory suggests a plethora of reasons to be dubious of most fa-
cets of the political process, including elections."
Chief among these is that the relationships between voters and
politicians, be they executives or legislators, are riddled with agency
23 Compare Jide Nzelbe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress,
53 UCLA L Rev 1217, 1231-43 (2006) (arguing that the Framers did not think the president
would better represent nationalist interests than Congress); James W. Ceaser, Presidential Selec-
tion: Theory and Development 47, 64-75 (Princeton 1979) (describing the Framers' vision of
executive power).
24 See Alan Siaroff, Varieties of Parliamentarianism in the Advanced Industrial Democracies,
24 Intl Polit Sci Rev 445,446-47 (2003); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 Harv
L Rev 633, 664-65 (2000); Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, Constitutional Frameworks and Demo-
cratic Consolidation: Parliamentarianism versus Presidentialism, 46 World Politics 1, 3-4 (1993).
25 See Dennis M. Simon, Presidents Governors; and ElectoralAccountability, 51 J Politics 286,
286-87 (1989) ("According to this perspective, electoral accountability is imposed on a systemic
or national basis through voting which is presidency-centered, retrospective, and result-based.").
26 See Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 Am Polit Sci Rev 515,516-25 (2003)
(developing models of representative democracy). See also generally Robert A. Dahl, Democra-
cy and Its Critics (Yale 1989); Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines (Oxford 1983).
27 See, for example, Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, Political Economics: Explaining
Economic Policy (MIT 2000) (providing a masterful survey and synthesis of the contemporary
literature on democratic policymaking).
28 See R. Douglas Arnold, Can Inattentive Citizens Control Their Representatives?, in Law-
rence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, Congress Reconsidered 401,404-06 (CQ Press 5th
ed 1993); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 219 (Harper & Row 1957); Ar-
thur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They
Need to Know? 79 (Cambridge 1998).
29 See generally Angus Campbell, et al, The American Voter (Wiley 1960) (documenting
widespread lack of information and opinions about politics).
30 See John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion 311-13 (Cambridge 1992)
(finding that public opinion is created by officials and elites rather than preexisting in voters);
William Riker, Liberalism against Populism 136 (Freeman 1982) (explaining that there is "an
unresolvable tension between logicality and fairness" that prevents discovery of a true majority
preference through electoral voting mechanisms).
31 See generally Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice III (Cambridge 2003).
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problems." Because politicians will often have information and exper-
tise that voters lack, politicians will have a significant degree of discre-
tion. If voter information is worse than politician information, voters
will often not be able to tell whether a policy that diverges from their
own preferences diverges for good reasons (politician expertise) or bad
reasons (divergent legislative preferences or self-interest). The agenda
control exercised by elected officials may also allow politicians to
enact policy that systematically diverges from voter preferences." So
long as representatives propose a new policy that is far from voter
preferences but less far than the status quo ante, voters may not be
able to obtain desired policy outcomes. Elections help manage or mi-
tigate these agency problems because elections provide a mechanism
for voters to select representatives who will take desirable actions,"
sanction politicians who fail to enact policy consistent with voter pre-
36ferences," or both."
32 Seminal contributions to the literature on agency problems in politics include Robert
Barro, The Control of Politicians:An Economic Model, 14 Pub Choice 19,22-26 (1973) (explain-
ing that in the absence of electoral consequences, a politician will seek to maximize his own
utility), and John Ferejohn, Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, 50 Pub Choice 5,5-26
(1986) (arguing that voters should pay more attention to actual performance than to campaign
promises, and presenting a model by which to do so).
33 See Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agen-
da.s and the Status Quo, 33 Pub Choice 27, 27-28 (1978) ("When the setter has monopoly power,
voters are forced to choose between the setter's proposal or the status quo or fallback position.").
34 Gautam Gowrisankaran, Matthew F Mitchell, and Andrea Moro, Electoral Design and
Voter Welfare from the U.S. Senate: Evidence from a Dynamic Selection Model, 11 Rev Econ
Dynamics 1, 2 (2008); Sanford C. Gordon, Gregory A. Huber, and Dimitri Landa, Challenger
Entry and Voter Learning, 101 Am Polit Sci Rev 303 (2007); Scott Ashworth and Ethan Bueno de
Mesquita, Delivering the Goods: Legislative Particularism in Different Electoral and Institutional
Settings, 68 J Pol 168, 169 (2006); James Fearon, ElectoralAccountability and the Control of Politi-
cians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance, in Adam Przeworski, Susan C.
Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation 55, 82 (Cam-
bridge 1999) (suggesting that, while elections serve both selection and sanctioning purposes, it
may be more reasonable for voters to focus on using elections as a method of selecting good
candidates rather than as a sanctioning mechanism); John Zaller, Politicians as Prize Fighters:
Electoral Selection and the Incumbency Advantage, in John G. Geer, ed, Politicians and Party
Politics 125-86 (Johns Hopkins 1998).
35 Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland, and Guido Tabellini, Separation of Powers and Political
Accountability, 112 Q J Econ 1163, 1166 (1997); Paul Seabright, Accountability and Decentralisa-
tion in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model, 40 Eur Econ Rev 61, 61-89 (1996); David
Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, Electoral Accountability and Incumbency, in Peter C. Orde-
shook, ed, Models of Strategic Choice in Politics 121, 122 (Michigan 1989); Ferejohn, 50 Pub
Choice at 22-23 (cited in note 32); Barro, 14 Pub Choice at 26-32 (cited in note 32).
36 Scott Ashworth and Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Electoral Selection, Strategic Challenger
Entry, and the Incumbency Advantage, 70 J Pol (forthcoming 2008); Timothy Besley and Michael
Smart, Fiscal Restraints and Voter Welfare, 9 J Pub Econ 755 (2007); Timothy Besley, Principled
Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government (Oxford 2006); Scott Ashworth, Reputa-
tional Dynamics and Political Careers, 21 J L, Econ, & Org 441 (2005); Brandice Canes-Wrone,
Michael C. Herron, and Kenneth W. Shotts, Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive
The Unbundled Executive
With respect to a democratic control of a national executive, elec-
tions are clearly an imperfect mechanism. Presidential elections every
two years would provide greater public accountability than elections
every four but would also generate greater participation costs for the
public. The extent of slack-divergence between public preferences
and political decisions or behavior-varies as a function of electoral
institutions. Our conceptual model holds constant electoral frequency
and instead restructures the executive authority that is regulated by
elections. Specifically, we suggest there are many benefits from un-
bundling executive authority.37
What would an unbundled executive look like? Suppose in a giv-
en jurisdiction there are j policy dimensions. On any given dimension,
the executive can choose either a special interest-friendly policy or a
voter-friendly policy. A majority of voters prefers the voter-friendly
policy on each dimension. However, there is an interest group in each
domain that prefers the special interest policy, and the group will pro-
vide a private benefit to the executive if the special interest's preferred
policy is enacted. This benefit may be a campaign contribution that
the executive can use to improve her lot at election time or a bribe
that can be used for private consumption. The executive would like to
receive the side payments from the interest groups, but only if doing
so will not cost her the next election.
Suppose there is only one single elected executive who has respon-
sibility for all j policy dimensions. This is the "general purpose" execu-
tive familiar in the US context; the single executive will be ascribed all
the blame and all the credit for executive policy decisions, and rightly
so. But because elections require voters to make a single elect-reject
decision, the crudeness of the electoral sanction is a weak way for vot-
ers to control the single executive on any particular policy dimension.
Voters must make a decision on a bundle of policy dimensions. As a
result, the official can enact special interest-friendly policies in some
dimensions, as long as she enacts voter-friendly policies on a sufficient
Policymaking, 45 Am J Polit Sci 532 (2001); Jeffrey S. Banks and Rangarjan Sundaram, Optimal
Retention in Agency Problems, 82 J Econ Theory 293,294 (1998).
37 See Besley and Coate, 1 J Eur Econ Assn at 1184-85 (cited in note 22) (explaining that
direct elections will lead to more pro-consumer regulatory regimes); Besley and Coate, Issue
Unbundling via Citizens' Initiatives (cited in noted 22). Our own revisions and applications are
presented in Berry and Gersen, Fiscal Consequences (cited in note 9). For other work on elected
versus appointed officials, see generally Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner,
Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather Than Appointed
Judiciary (The University of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No 357, Aug 2007)
(using independence, productivity, and opinion quality to compare and evaluate appointed and
elected judges); Gregory A. Huber and Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is
Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 Am J Polit Sci 247 (2004) (evaluating the effects of
elections on the behavior of trial judges in sentencing proceedings).
2008] 1393
The University of Chicago Law Review
number of dimensions to secure reelection. For general purpose ex-
ecutives, elections will not completely mitigate agency problems, though
naturally they produce more policies that are closer to majority-voter
preferences than an executive system without elections.
Contrast the general purpose (bundled) executive with the possi-
bility of "special purpose" executives. Suppose there are only three
important policy dimensions about which the public cares. Rather than
elect one executive to oversee all of them, the jurisdiction elects three
executives, each of whom is responsible only for one of the policies.
When one executive has exclusive responsibility for providing only a
single policy-for example, water or sanitation or defense -citizens
need not aggregate judgments across multiple policy issues at election
time. A vote for or against the special purpose executive summarizes
voter preferences on a single policy dimension. An executive who
enacts an interest group-friendly policy in her single domain will not
be able to placate voters with voter-friendly policies on other issues.
The above discussion emphasizes the desirable incentives for elected
officials produced by the unbundled executive. The unbundled execu-
tive also produces beneficial selection effects. The selection problem
for voter is to identify a "good type" executive, typically meaning a
mix of capability, expertise, experience, judgment, and so on. Candi-
date quality, however, may vary dimension by dimension. Candidates
who would make for good executives during war may not be execu-
tives who will be good economy executives. In the single completely
bundled regime, voters must select one candidate who is either an av-
erage good type or who is a good type on some dimensions, but less
capable on others. In the unbundled executive regime, voters are free
to select a good environmental type as the environment executive
while selecting a good military type as the war executive. The unbun-
dled executive allows voters to better match expertise, ability, and
other characteristics that make for government performance to the
underlying jurisdiction of government offices.
Specialized elected executives therefore make elections more ef-
fective mechanisms for selecting and controlling officials; the greater
the unbundling, the greater the mitigation of agency problems in gov-
ernment)8 In short, an unbundled executive is more electorally ac-
countable than a single executive.
38 See Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 158-61 (Princeton 2000). The logic of
issue unbundling has been applied sporadically in other settings. For example, one paper pro-
vides empirical support for the issue unbundling argument by contrasting elected and appointed
utility regulators. See Besley and Coate, 1 J Eur Econ Assn 1176 (cited in note 22). Using panel
data for US states, they find that elected regulators systematically enact more consumer-friendly
policies than appointed regulators. See id at 1191. The unbundling intuition has also been used to
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If so, why not design an executive structure with hundreds of di-
rectly elected executives? There is a theoretical limit to the benefits
that can be achieved by executive unbundling because there are costs
produced by increasing the number of elected executives.39 Consider
two cost variants: monitoring costs and coordination costs. The addi-
tion of new elected executives produces an increase in monitoring costs.
Each additional officer added to the ballot requires additional work on
the part of voters. As the number of elected executives grows, the costs
to citizens of monitoring a legion of public officials increases and may
outweigh any marginal benefits associated with issue unbundling.
Although monitoring costs might entail many factors, we focus on
two components. The first is a function of the number of issues for
which an executive provides policy. A voter has to determine whether
each policy has been set at the level she prefers. This first component
is a function of the number of aggregate policy dimensions and (im-
portantly) largely independent from the number of elected executives.
The second is a function of the number of elected executives rather
than the number of overall issues. For each executive, the citizen must
be able to identify the incumbent and assess her responsibility for a
particular service or services.
Consider a random voter at the polls. On the ballot, she sees a list
of offices, and for each office a list of names. The ballot often does not
identify the incumbent, and in most cases it does not even list a politi-
explain one of the benefits of citizen initiatives. See John G. Matsusaka, Fiscal Effects of the Voter
Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years, 103 J Pol Econ 587,590 (1995). For an extension of the
implications of the direct democracy argument for the executive branch, see John G. Matsusaka,
Direct Democracy and the Executive Branch *23-24 (unpublished manuscript, 2007), available
online at http://www-rcf.usc.edu/-matsusak/Papers/Matsusaka DD Executive2007.pdf (visited
Aug 29,2008). By unbundling a single issue from a legislative logroll-be it budgetary or policy-
voters are thought to be able to better ensure outcomes close to majoritarian preferences for the
given policy dimension. Id at *24. This same theme is at play in the scattered assortment of justi-
fications given for single-subject limitations in state constitutions, for instance in Colorado and
Florida. See Robert D. Cooter and Michael D. Gilbert, Chaos, Direct Democracy and the Single
Subject Rule *11 (Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper No 183, Feb 2006),
online at http://repositories.cdlib.orgblewp/art183 (visited Aug 29, 2008); Michael D. Gilbert,
Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U Pitt L Rev 803, 812-21 (2006) (setting forth
the history of and principal justifications for the single-subject rule); Martha J. Dragich, State
Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure: Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose,
Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 Harv J on Legis 103, 114-16 (2001) (explaining the
purpose of single-subject limitations in state constitutions). The single-subject limitation is sup-
posed to preclude logrolls in which policies favored only by a minority of politicians or voters
are enacted together. The logic of unbundling then is general, and we are agnostic about whether
unbundling in any particular instance is good or bad. In the single-subject context, logrolls could
easily be welfare enhancing so long as the value to the minority receiving benefits along each
dimension is high enough. The point is merely that the idea of unbundling has been usefully
applied in a handful of other legal and policy contexts.
39 Berry and Gersen, Fiscal Consequences at 6-7 (cited in note 9).
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cal party affiliation. ° At a minimum, a voter must be able to identify
the incumbent for each office and match the incumbent to an assess-
ment of the service(s) performed by the office in question. Where
there is only one general purpose executive, all services can be attri-
buted to one official. The voter needs only to know which candidate is
the incumbent and to form an overall assessment of the incumbent's
performance. Where there are many offices, the task becomes consi-
derably more challenging. In practice, it is not at all unusual to find
two dozen or more elected offices on a local government ballot. We
use the term monitoring costs to denote the total effort required to
evaluate all services in a jurisdiction and match them to the relevant
incumbent officials.
In addition to monitoring costs, unbundling executive authority al-
so produces coordination costs. When two similar policies are produced
by different executive authorities without coordination, these policies
might conflict or at least not work as well in tandem as might be the
case if the policies were produced by a unified policymaker. For poli-
cies that are jointly produced by two specialized elected offices, these
coordination costs will be most severe.
Some unbundling of executive authority should reduce slack, mak-
ing policy more democratic. Too much unbundling could actually in-
crease slack, allowing politicians to implement personal rather than
public preferences. As monitoring costs increase, each elected execu-
tive might receive less scrutiny from voters. Officials governing specia-
lized domains could then adopt special interest-friendly policies with-
out suffering electoral reprisals. Similarly, for certain subsets of poli-
cies, coordination costs could swamp democratic benefits.
When executive authority is unbundled and given solely to a spe-
cialized executive directly elected by the public, this is the purest form
of executive unbundling. The general purpose executive now has re-
sponsibility for j - 1 policy dimensions and the special purpose official
responsibility for one. There are, however, intermediate variants, in-
volving different appointment and removal schemes that produce more
complicated tradeoffs.
Consider first a straightforward theoretical example. Suppose a
specialized environment executive is appointed by a general purpose
executive. Environmental issues are partially unbundled in the sense
that one official exists who primarily oversees environmental policy.
40 About three-quarters of local elections are nonpartisan. Brian F Schaffner, Matthew
Streb, and Gerald Wright, Teams without Uniforms: The Nonpartisan Ballot in State and Local
Elections, 54 Polit Rsrch Q 7, 7 (2001), quoting Victor S. DeSantis and Tari Renner, Contempo-
rary Patterns and Trends in Municipal Government Structure, in The Municipal Year Book 1991
(ICMA 1991).
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However, because the choices of who to appoint and how to regulate
and when to remove are still maintained by the general purpose ex-
ecutive, environmental issues are not perfectly unbundled. Part of
what makes the unbundled executive intuition attractive is that there
is one executive with exclusive authority to make decisions about one
policy dimension. To the extent that the authority to make final deci-
sions is somewhat shared, the crispness of the pure scheme wanes.
The general purpose executive can obviously be disciplined by
voters if, for example, she selects a bad environment executive. But the
general purpose executive would still be able to appoint poor specia-
lized executives on some dimensions, so long as policy was good
enough on a majority of dimensions. If the environment executive is
directly elected, the reelection vote only need summarize approval on
one policy dimension. When executive authority is parceled out to
officials who are not directly elected, things are significantly more un-
wieldy. Net effects depend on whether the authority is exclusive or
overlapping and whether the appointment is vested in the discretion
of only one institution or several.
Now consider the unwieldy empirical reality. The range of me-
chanisms for selecting executive officials in the states is quite exten-
sive." When appointment power is given to the governor, sometimes
no approval from another political institution is needed; sometimes
the senate must approve; sometimes both houses of the legislature
must approve; sometimes either house can approve; sometimes a
board or council must approve; sometimes only a legislative commit-
tee must do so. For certain offices, an agency head appoints without
approval from another institution; sometimes the governor must ap-
prove; sometimes the senate or a legislative institution must do so. For
other offices, a board or council appoints, subject to approval by the
governor and/or the senate. For still other offices, the legislature di-
rectly appoints administrative officials.
These different appointment schemes also produce different de-
grees of unbundling and therefore of public control over policy. If di-
rect election of a special purpose executive official results in the most
unbundling, appointment of an official by one institution-be it the
governor, the legislature, or a state board or commission-with the
consent of another institution, where policy jurisdiction is shared, con-
stitutes the least unbundling. In this case, not only can the appointed
official not be directly sanctioned by the public, but it is not clear
41 Any volume of the Book of the States contains multiple examples. See, for example, 39
Book of the States 181 (Council of State Governments 2007) (providing an overview of selection
methods for state administrative officials in the fifty states as well as in American Samoa, Guam,
the Northern Mariana Islands, and the US Virgin Islands).
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which institution should be punished for a bad appointment. Standard
models of appointments emphasize that both the nominating and the
consenting institution will affect the selection and approval of offic-
ers.2 Without the ability to blame or credit a single elected official,
public sanctions will be less effective. Moreover, when the appointed
official shares authority for policy implementation with other officials
or institutions, it is difficult to know who to blame for failure or to
credit for success. Appointment of executive officials with overlapping
jurisdiction may be desirable for other reasons, but there is little in the
way of unbundling benefits. Whereas unbundling by independent elec-
tion clarifies which public officials can be held responsible for which
public policies, the hybrid appointment schemes muddle responsibility.
Indirect appointment schemes are less effective for controlling moral
hazard in politics.3 Between these two extreme positions fall officials
who are appointed by a single elected official (usually the governor)
with exclusive policy authority (more unbundling) and officials who
are appointed with the consent of multiple institutions with exclusive
policy authority (less unbundling).
Democratic accountability or responsiveness is only one design
consideration among many. However, it is a particularly prominent one
in constitutional design. On this dimension of comparison, the unbun-
dled executive should outperform the single executive. The unbundled
executive produces greater accountability in the executive than the
single completely bundled executive. We turn to other design consid-
erations momentarily; however, we pause briefly to show that the un-
bundled executive is not merely a construct of scholarly imagination.
Variants of unbundled executive regimes do exist in practice.
42 See generally Nolan McCarty, The Appointments Dilemma, 48 Am J Polit Sci 413 (2004)
(developing a model that demonstrates the problems arising from a system that divides ap-
pointments from responsibility); David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology,
20 J L, Econ, & Org 438 (2001); Timothy R Nokken and Brian R. Sala, Confirmation Dynamics:
A Model of Presidential Appointments to Independent Agencies, 12 J Theoretical Polit 91 (2000)
(presenting an agenda control model to explain how a president may capture an independent
agency through appointments or how the Senate may prevent the president from doing so);
Susan K. Snyder and Barry R. Weingast, The American System of Shared Powers: The President,
Congress, and the NLRB, 16 J L, Econ, & Org 269 (2000) (applying a model to NLRB appoint-
ments and finding that both the president and the Senate influence board policy); Nolan McCar-
ty and Rose Razaghian, Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations
1885-1996,43 Am J Polit Sci 1122 (1999) ("[lInefficiency arises because the executive chooses an
agent whose preferences diverge too much from those of the legislature. The legislature then
responds by reducing the resources available to the agency.").
43 See Persson, Roland, and Tabellini, 112 Q J Econ at 1167 (cited in note 35) ("Direct
control by the voters keeps the executive more accountable, as it minimizes the danger of collu-
sion between the legislature and the executive over reappointment of the latter.").
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B. The Unbundled Executive in Practice
The federal government does not rely on an unbundled executive
structure, but state and local governments certainly do." Indeed, par-
tial unbundling of executive authority is the norm rather than an ex-
ception in virtually all nonnational government units in the United
States, of which there are more than eighty thousand. Authority that
the governor or mayor would otherwise exercise is frequently given to
a specific state or local officer. Often these officers are directly elected
by the public; other times they are elected by the legislature; other
times still, they are appointed by another state official. These ar-
rangements are only approximations of the unbundled executive ideal
because there is residual responsibility or authority for the policy in
the general purpose executive. Still, as executive authority is even par-
tially unbundled and primary responsibility for specific policy domains
is given to a directly elected official, policy outcomes should move
closer to public preferences along that dimension. Both the general
purpose and the special purpose executives should be more respon-
sive to public preferences.
To give a sense of the institutional variation which we are describing,
Table 1 presents aggregate measures from the Census of Government,
revealing that there were nearly 19,000 elected officials in state gov-
ernments as of 1992. Of these, members of state legislatures represented
roughly 7,500 and members of other elected state boards accounted for
44 The most comprehensive survey of the impact of state political and legal institutions on
politics and policy is Timothy Besley and Anne Case, Political Institutions and Policy Choices:
Evidence from the United States, 41 J Econ Lit 7 (2003). See, for example, Alessandro Lizzeri and
Nocola Persico, The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives, 91 Am
Econ Rev 225 (2001) (assessing the effects of different electoral systems on the provision of
public goods); James M. Poterba, Budget Institutions and Fiscal Policy in the US. States, 86 Am
Econ Rev 395 (1996); Timothy Besley and Anne Case, Does Electoral Accountability Affect
Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits, 110 Q J Econ 769 (1995);
Rigard G. Niemi, Harold W. Stanley, and Ronald J. Vogel, State Economies and State Taxes: Do
Voters Hold Governors Accountable?, 39 Am J Polit Sci 936 (1995) (finding that a poor state
economy, an increase in taxes, and poor personal finances cause voters to vote against incum-
bents); James E. Alt and Robert C. Lowry, Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget
Deficits: Evidence from the States, 88 Am Polit Sci Rev 811 (1994) (discussing the effects of parti-
san division of power on state budgets); James M. Poterba, State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The
Effects of Budgetary Institutions and Politics, 102 J Polit Econ 799 (1994) (suggesting that state
fiscal institutions and political environments affect state budget deficits); John E. Chubb, Institu-
tions, the Economy, and the Dynamics of State Elections, 82 Am Polit Sci Rev 133 (1988) (evaluat-
ing the electoral consequences of increasing institutionalization and importance of state gov-
ernments). See also G. Bingham Powell, Jr. and Guy D. Whitten, A Cross-national Analysis of
Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context, 37 Am J Polit Sci 391 (1993); Arend
Lijphart, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945-85,84 Am Polit Sci Rev 481 (1990)
(evaluating the effects of electoral systems on proportionality and multipartism across countries
with different types of electoral systems).
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another 1,300. The majority of state officials fell into the other catego-
ry, comprising those individual elected offices outside any board or leg-
islative body. The bulk of these are unbundled executives.
Interestingly, the number of these independent elected officials
grew spectacularly from 1967 to 1992, more than doubling from 4,200
to over 10,000. In comparison to the national government, it is per-
haps startling that there are more elected state officials outside the
state legislature than within it. This trend is new, emerging only within
the past forty years. Moreover, the variation in executive unbundling
across states is, if anything, even more dramatic than the changes over
time, as evidenced in Tables 2 and 3. There are only 80 state elected
officials in Delaware, while there are 1,200 in Pennsylvania. As of
1992, New Jersey had only one elected official outside the state legis-
lature (that is, the governor), whereas four other states-Texas, Penn-
sylvania, New York, and Florida-each had over six hundred nonlegis-
lative elected officials.
Turning to the specific executive offices, Table 4 shows that the
governor is the only position that is elected in every state. As of 2002,
the attorney general is elected in forty-three, while the treasurer and
secretary of state are each elected in thirty-eight states. Beyond these
familiar offices, a number of more obscure executive positions are
elected in a handful of states. For instance, utility regulators, education
commissioners, and comptrollers are elected in less than half the states,
while the adjutant general is elected in only one. Comparing the fig-
ures for 1977 and 2002, we see the emergence of several new elected
executive offices within the past quarter century. Banking regulators,
election administrators, finance offices, and community affairs repre-
sentatives all joined the ranks of state elected officials for the first
time during this period.
Individual states show substantial differences in the extent of elec-
toral unbundling of the executive branch (Table 5). Of the twenty-two
executive offices that were elected in at least one state, there is no
single state in which more than half of these different offices are
elected. Maine, New Hampshire, and New Jersey stand out as the only
states in which the governor is the sole elected executive officer. At
the other extreme, five states-Florida, Idaho, North Dakota, South
Carolina, and Washington-each hold elections for eleven different
executive offices. The average number of elected executive offices per
state was 6.7 in 2002, up from 6.0 in 1977. All told then, state and local
governments unbundle executive authority to a significant degree, at
least when compared to the complete bundling that occurs in the
federal government.
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Elsewhere, we have estimated the impact of different degrees of
executive unbundling on public policy." Using various measures of un-
bundling, different estimation techniques, and different data sources,
the extent of unbundling consistently produces differences in policy
outcomes. This is true not only from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but also
within a political jurisdiction over time. Some unbundling produces out-
comes closer to public preferences and too much unbundling produces
more slack. The result holds not only for state government but also for
local government structures. This simple empirical result has far-reaching
implications for institutional design and constitutional theory.
II. EXECUTIVE DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS
A. Unbundled versus Concurrent Authority
Our model of an unbundled executive is closely related to two de-
bates in constitutional theory, one active and one dormant. Rather
than analyze the costs and benefits of the unbundled executive in iso-
lation, we rely on these disputes as a lens through which to view the
unbundled executive model.
The dormant dispute is whether there should be a single or plural
executive. This executive numerosity question is dormant with good
reason. The US Constitution clearly resolves it in favor of the single
executive. In other times and places, this question has been resolved
otherwise, and our work suggests the single executive position is not
the only tenable one. Elsewhere there is far more variation in the way
that executive authority is structured. In ancient Rome, there was a
dual magistracy.7 Andorra is technically structured as a duumvirate,
ruled by two co-princes. 8 These arrangements are obviously somewhat
different from the pure version of an unbundled executive, but com-
parative contexts do show far more variation.
The second, more active dispute is whether the single executive
should have strong or weak hierarchical (vertical) control over the ex-
ecution or administration of law. Does and should the Constitution es-
tablish strong vertical or hierarchical control by the president over all
45 See generally Berry and Gersen, Fiscal Consequences (cited in note 9).
46 Compare Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, An Economic Model of Representative
Democracy, 112 Q J Econ 85 (1997). See also Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole, The Politician and the
Judge: Accountability in Government, 94 Am Econ Rev 1034, 1035-37 (2004) (comparing deci-
sions in direct democracy, representative democracy, and judicial settings and assessing the role
of accountability).
47 Karl Loewenstein, The Governance of Rome 48-51 (Martinus Nijhoff 1973).
48 A.H. Angelo, Andorra: Introduction to a Customary Legal System, 14 Am J Legal Hist
95,98 (1970).
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officials who implement federal law? Properly cabined, this is or should
be the key question in the unitary executive debate.
A critical additional question only becomes intelligible if the nu-
merosity question is resolved in favor of multiple executives. Given
multiple executives, should their authority be concurrent, partially
overlapping, or exclusive vis-A-vis each other? The single versus plural
debate generally assumes that multiple executives must exercise over-
lapping authority, and for this reason concludes the arrangement pro-
duces ineffective or inefficient government. This assumption is defens-
ible on historical grounds because most plural executives were coun-
cils, the members of which shared concurrent authority. Once the as-
sumption of overlapping authority is relaxed, however, the force of
many standard critiques of plural executive systems wanes.
One reason the unbundled executive appears startling is that these
separate analytic questions have become conflated. If the single-plural
question has been resolved in favor of one executive, the unbundling
question seems nonsensical. If executive authority can only be overlap-
ping, then a plural executive looks ineffective. If one favors a strong
unitary executive, any plural system first looks unappealing because
authority that is not centralized tends to be weak. Thus, in this Part, we
try to keep these dimensions of potential institutional choice distinct,
matching existing critiques and intuitions to the relevant dimension.
We emphasize two claims throughout this section. First, any gen-
eral criticism of plural or unbundled executives must somewhat re-
concile dire predictions about government failure that would derive
from a plural executive and the reality of successful state governments
in the United States. It is possible that state and local governments
would be even better without unbundled authority, but it is uncharita-
ble in the extreme, not to mention empirically unsustainable, to de-
scribe all unbundled state governments as completely dysfunctional.
Second, there is an essential difference between unbundled authority
and concurrent authority. The most prominent critiques of the plural
executive model target schemes in which several executives act in
consort with overlapping authority. Such schemes may well produce
government dysfunction, unaccountability, or trend towards tyranny,
but the unbundled executive does not.
B. Executives, Single and Plural
The reasons that a plural executive regime was rejected and a sin-
gle executive regime embraced are many. But there are only a handful
of recurrent themes that truly dominate this debate. First and fore-
most is a suggestion that single executives are democratically account-
able; plural executives are not. As we have now repeatedly suggested,
this is simply a mistake deriving from confusion about what features
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of plural executives are necessary and which are merely common. Sin-
gle executives are also said to be better at providing uniformity and
coordination in the implementation of law.9 Single executives are of-
ten required by the inherent nature of policy issues that constitute
important cores of executive authority, like war and trade. A common
suggestion in the convention era debates was that only a single execu-
tive could provide the energy, strength, and agility necessary to sustain
the fledgling executive branch; another, that something inherent in the
notion of separation of powers requires a single executive."o Each of
these ideas has an intuitive superficial appeal, but each is also wrong,
or at least not quite right. Along virtually all of these dimensions the
unbundled executive performs as well or better than the single execu-
tive. When considered as a whole, rather than dimension by dimen-
sion, the case for the unbundled executive is all the stronger. Our dis-
cussion no doubt loses much of the nuance in these complex debates.
Nonetheless, we attempt to address the most common collection of
relevant ideas and arguments related to numerosity and unitariness.
1. Accountability.
The most frequent argument in favor of a single and strong ex-
ecutive has to do with democratic accountability. The president is the
only elected official with a truly national constituency. Multiple execu-
tives would create confusion and ambiguity about which officials were
responsible for what policy. The same claim is made with respect to
independent agencies in the unitary executive debate. The inability to
impose electoral sanctions would undermine the democratic process,
debilitating the ability of voters to select and discipline politicians, or
so the argument goes. Hamilton articulated this idea with some force:
But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the Execu-
tive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is
that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.... It of-
ten becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine
on whom the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure,
or series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall. It is shifted
from one to another with so much dexterity, and under such
plausible appearances, that the public opinion is left in suspense
about the real author. The circumstances which may have led to
49 Lessig and Sunstein, 94 Colum L Rev at 2 (cited in note 18).
50 See Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L J at 602 (cited in note 18). Although Calabresi
and Prakash are focused on the question of executive unitariness rather than singularity, many of
these same ideas were levied against plural executives. The application to unitariness is probably
the extension rather than vice versa.
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any national miscarriage or misfortune are sometimes so compli-
cated that, where there are a number of actors who may have had
different degrees and kinds of agency, though we may clearly see
upon the whole that there has been mismanagement, yet it may
be impracticable to pronounce to whose account the evil which
may have been incurred is truly chargeable."
Whether or not this passage supports the strong unitary executive vi-
sion as it is sometimes taken to do,52 it clearly favors a single rather
than plural executive. The underlying ideas are intuitive and the rhe-
toric powerful, but in our view, the central claim is simply incorrect. It
assumes a plural executive must entail overlapping or concurrent au-
thority rather than exclusive authority. When multiple parties share
authority, it may in fact be difficult to assign blame or credit. But as
noted above, the single versus plural executive dimension is concep-
tually distinct from the overlapping versus exclusive jurisdiction di-
mension." In theory at least, it is straightforward to construct a plural
executive with exclusive authority or jurisdiction. Our model of the
unbundled executive does just that.
True, as a historical matter, the multiple executive structures of
which we are aware, often entailed overlapping authority, and therefore,
this slippage is understandable. It is also true that when authority for a
policy is given to many actors, none of whom is clearly in control, it
will be difficult for voters to blame or credit any single official and im-
pose electoral sanctions accordingly. This idea from Federalist No 70
was echoed elsewhere in the convention era debates, along with famil-
iar claims about shirking and free riding in multimember bodies. "We
well know what numerous executives are. We know there is neither
vigor, decision, nor responsibility, in them."" These arguments were
offered again and again against those who favored executive councils.
Indeed, this is part of the difficulty with using elections to sanction offi-
cials in the legislative branch: it is a multimember body, and when
multimember bodies fail, parsing responsibility is difficult.
51 Federalist 70 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 471,476 (cited in note 5).
52 See, for example, Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003
Ill L Rev 701, 732 (arguing that, at the time of the founding, people understood that the presi-
dent had power over the execution of all laws, including control over others who were responsi-
ble for execution); Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive during the
First Half-century, 47 Case W Res L Rev 1451,1487 (1997).
53 Contrast Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative
Law, 2006 S Ct Rev 201,207-36, 242-43 (clarifying the distinction between overlapping, concur-
rent, and exclusive agency authority in the context of administrative law).
54 Speech of James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec 4, 1787), in Kurland
and Lerner, eds, 3 The Founders' Constitution at 501 (cited in note 2).
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The simple difference between the unbundled executive and the
typical plural executive critiqued by political and legal theorists is that
the former involves (more or less) exclusive authority of the individual
executives, while the latter entails (more or less) overlapping authority.
The unbundled executive would involve parceling it out to well-
identified and directly elected officials, which facilitates rather than un-
dermines the democratic process- clarifying authority rather than am-
biguating it. To reiterate an earlier point, a vote for or against a presi-
dential candidate is remarkably crude; it is a weighted average of voter
approval of dozens if not hundreds of policy dimensions. A vote for or
against an elected secretary of education is less so. Directly electing one
official to oversee one policy does not obviously create more democrat-
ic slack than electing one official to oversee hundreds of policies. So
long as unbundling is coupled with exclusive authority within a juris-
diction, the unbundled executive is preferable on accountability grounds.
2. Functional duties and single executives.
Even if the unbundled executive serves state and local govern-
ments well, maybe the characteristics of the national presidency differ
in critical ways. For example, one frequent assertion is that functional
characteristics of the national presidency demand that one single indi-
vidual have all executive authority. Governors, for example, do not
manage armed conflicts or foreign policy; they do not negotiate with
other sovereign states. When war and peace are at stake, it is especial-
ly important that the country speak with one voice capable of quick
and decisive action. In the same way that spreading authority across
multiple institutions slows the pace of action when a rapid response is
required," dispersing this authority among multiple executives does so
as well. Controlling militaries and dealing with war require a single,
strong executive.6
To start with, we note a minor historical point. In the 1700s, the
single versus plural executive issue was distinct from whether the ex-
ecutive should have authority to make war or peace (exclusively or
concurrently). Charles Pinckney, for example, favored a single vigor-
ous executive but did not want the executive power to entail authority
55 See Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Terror in the Balance 16 (Oxford 2007) ("The
real cause of deference to government in times of emergency is institutional: both Congress and
the judiciary defer to the executive during emergencies because of the executive's institutional
advantages in speed, secrecy and decisiveness.").
56 See Saikrishna B. Prakash and Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 Yale L J 231, 252-62 (2001) (emphasizing the importance of singularity or one voice
in the domain of foreign affairs).
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to make war and peace. 7 A single executive did not necessarily imply
the power to make war; the power to make war did not necessarily
prohibit a plural executive. Others favored an independent but plural
executive." These questions are related, of course, but one does not
dictate the other, either as a matter of theory or history.
Nonetheless, suppose we assume foreign relations as a policy is-
sue does require that a single individual exercise ultimate control, and
that being commander in chief is similar in this respect. Nothing in this
view implies that a single executive should have control over all ex-
ecutive authority. It means only that each individual policy of this sort
should be controlled by one executive official. The claims about rapid
response or speaking with one voice-even if correct-mean only one
executive officer should have exclusive policy jurisdiction in the rele-
vant domain; these claims support a single executive within a policy
dimension, but not necessarily across policy dimensions.
The critical question from the unbundled executive perspective is
whether one single individual should have authority over this entire
set of executive policies. To give a purely hypothetical example, it is
easy to imagine a case in which voters might wish to remove, say, the
secretary of defense over the conduct of a failed war without replacing
the president. When the two offices are bundled together in a single
executive, voters must make a single elect-reject decision in the presi-
dential election. If the secretary of defense were directly elected, vot-
ers could express displeasure over the war without throwing out a
president who was succeeding on many other dimensions. Confusion
about the relationship between numerosity and exclusivity in govern-
ment authority is common; the unbundled executive helps clarify
matters, or so we hope.
3. Energy.
Energy is another important principle used to support both the
single executive and later the unitary executive. 9 Many of the framers
were explicitly concerned with designing a national executive with suf-
57 See Max Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 64-65 (Yale rev ed
1966) (Madison, June 1) ("Mr. Pinkney [sic] was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the
Executive powers of (the existing) Congress might extend to peace & war &c which would rend-
er the Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, towit an elective one.").
58 See, for example, William Symmes, Letter to Capt Peter Osgood, Jr., in Herberg J. Stor-
ing, ed, 4 The Complete Anti-Federalist 60 (Chicago 1981) (acknowledging that an independent
executive is necessary but questioning whether the power should be vested in a single person).
See also Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L J at 604-06 (cited in note 18) (arguing that the mention
of "Heads of Departments" or "principal officers" referred to actors within the executive branch).
59 Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L J at 639 (cited in note 18) ("The Framers wished to con-
struct a unitary Executive since they felt it was conducive to energy, dispatch, and responsibility.").
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ficient energy, fearing a national government that was too weak would
crumble. In these early debates, energy quite literally refers to the in-
centive for government officials to be diligent in the performance of
public functions. In Federalist No 37, for example, Madison argued
that "[e]nergy in Government is essential to that security against ex-
ternal and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution
of the laws, which enter into the very definition of good Govern-
ment."' Hamilton went further:
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of
good government. It is essential to the protection of the communi-
ty against foreign attacks: It is not less essential to the steady ad-
ministration of the laws, to the protection of property against those
irregular and high handed combinations, which sometimes inter-
rupt the ordinary course of justice, to the security of liberty against
the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy.6
The trouble with this view is that there is slippage between the claim
that one individual with control over one policy will be optimally
energetic and the conclusion that one individual with control over all
relevant policies will be optimally energetic. We are aware of no espe-
cially compelling reason that a single executive with authority over
j policy dimensions would be more energetic -in the parlance of the
Founders-than j executives each of whom has exclusive responsibili-
ty for one dimension. If the claim were correct, then legions of state
and local governments are "suboptimal" on the energy dimension.
Perhaps so, but the extent of state and local government failure is not
particularly high. If the US states constitute fifty data points of gov-
ernmen t ont~nuity and the national government one, it seems odd to
conclude that the fifty have insufficiently energetic governments, and
the one does not.
More plausible is that there is something akin to economies of
scale in executive authority, which makes control of j policy dimen-
sions by one executive more efficient than control by j executives. If
so, then it is suboptimal to entirely unbundle executive authority, but
we have already said as much above. Moreover, just as the corner so-
lution of complete unbundling is unlikely to be optimal, so too is the
opposite corner solution of no unbundling. More likely, at least in our
view, is that the relevant economies of scale suggest that some execu-
tive unbundling is better than none or all.
60 Federalist 37 (Madison), in The Federalist 231,233 (cited in note 5).
61 Federalist 70 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 471,471 (cited in note 5).
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4. Balance of powers.
If energy alone does not justify a single executive, perhaps the
background separation of powers in the constitutional structure does
indirectly. In order for each branch to guard against infractions by the
others, a single executive may be required. One idea on this front is
historical: because of the inherent weakness of the president and the
relative strength of the legislature during the founding era, institu-
tional features needed to be calibrated to ensure a balance between
the two. For example, bicameralism was necessary to weaken the legis-
lative branch, and a strong single and unitary executive was needed to
strengthen the president to create rough parity. 2
The problems with this view are extensive. A first mistake is con-
ceptual, equating strength with a lack of numerosity. Three executives
who cannot agree are surely weaker than one executive, but three ex-
ecutives of similar mind, acting in consort, are not obviously so. If any-
thing, they would seem as strong as or stronger than one executive.
Alternatively, claiming the Founders worked ardently to strengthen
the executive borders on disingenuous. Some sought a strong execu-
tive and favored a single executive for that reason; others were con-
cerned that a single executive naturally trends toward monarchy, a
result to be avoided." Indeed, the ideas seem an odd overlay to inter-
branch relations in the 1700s. The president had comparatively narrow
authority and resources: granting one president strong hierarchical
control over virtually nothing seems a peculiar corrective to concerns
about a too powerful Congress.
Alternatively, perhaps the relevant claim is that a single executive
is necessary to protect against incursions by an aggressive legislature.
Balance of powers would be one criterion, but not the only one.
Another question is how well a given executive structure would be
able to patrol and protect the borders of its authority. The trouble for
the single executive view is that there is no particularly good reason to
suspect a single executive would more aggressively protect her pur-
view over j policy dimensions than would j executives, each of whom
62 Id at 472-73 (arguing that subjecting the executive, "in whole or in part, to the control
and co-operation of others" would undermine the executive's status as a co-equal branch with
the legislature).
63 See Farrand, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention at 66 (Madison, June 1) (cited in
note 57) ("Mr. Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He regarded
it as the foetus of monarchy."). On the other hand, there was skepticism about growth of authori-
ty of a plural executive as well. See id at 74 (Pierce, June 2) ("Mr. Wilson said that in his opinion
so far from a unity of the Executive tending to progress towards a monarchy it would be the
circumstance to prevent it. A plurality in the Executive of Government would probably produce
a tyranny as bad as the thirty Tyrants of Athens, or as the Decemvirs of Rome.").
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has responsibility for a single policy dimension. If anything, unbun-
dling authority in this way might create stronger incentives for pro-
tecting turf because the proportional losses to a given executive would
be greater from congressional incursion. In general form, the single ex-
ecutive view suggests grounds would be better patrolled by one guard
than a dozen simply because the average (per guard) energy exerted
would be lower in the plural setting; the relevant criterion of course is
the aggregate energy and it would be altogether surprising if plurals
did not do better on this front than one.
5. Uniformity.
What of other values that a single executive is supposed to serve
like uniformity and coordination?" We have already suggested that
the unbundled executive is preferable on accountability grounds, but
what about coordination and uniformity in a world of unbundled ex-
ecutive authority?
Properly cabined, the legal value of uniformity concerns the simi-
lar application of one legal principle in many different settings. That is,
uniformity is about consistent application of law within a policy di-
mension. Serving the interests of uniformity is sometimes said to re-
quire a single executive, a unitary executive, or both. A single executive
without unitary hierarchical control might not be able ensure that dif-
ferent subordinates always apply the law in identical or at least similar
ways. Multiple executives might apply or implement the same law in
different ways in different contexts or to different people. In either case,
uniformity would be undermined and faith in the rule of law sacrificed.
Again, however, the assumption of overlapping authority obfus-
cates matters. The unbundled executive framework starts with the
premise that policy responsibility can be taken away from a general
purpose executive and given to a special purpose executive. No doubt
this is something of an abstraction, but it is important to distinguish
principled objections from practical ones. If policy can be distributed
in this way, then uniformity is no longer an objection. Multiple execu-
tives with concurrent jurisdiction might produce a lack of uniformity,
but multiple executives with exclusive jurisdiction would not-or at
least would do so no more or no less than a single executive.
In point of fact, there is likely to be even greater uniformity in the
unbundled executive scheme. Why? In the single bundled executive
structure, there is ultimately one person who must ensure the uniform
64 See Lessig and Sunstein, 94 Colum L Rev at 2 (cited in note 18) ("A strongly unitary ex-
ecutive can promote important values of accountability, coordination, and uniformity in the execu-
tion of laws, and to whatever extent these were the framers' values, they are certainly now ours").
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implementation of federal law across dozens or even hundreds of dif-
ferent policy domains. The best case scenario is that this is enormously
difficult and costly; the worst case scenario is that it borders on im-
possible. In the unbundled executive scheme, one executive must en-
sure the uniform implementation and application of federal law in a
single domain. This is hard as well, but it is an order of magnitude less
difficult than in the completely bundled regime. Moreover, the resi-
dual general purpose executive who must ensure uniformity in many
policy domains (in the partially unbundled world) must now do so for
a subset of the total set of policy domains. The costs of doing so may
still be substantial, but they are strictly lower than those faced by the
general executive in the bundled regime. General purpose executives
must by their nature focus on an expansive list of policies; specialized
purpose executives need focus on only one. This is the flipside of the
"blinders" or "tunnel vision" problem that agencies with a single mis-
sion sometimes have in regulatory policy."5 Importantly, institutional
designers who care a great deal about uniformity might well prefer
strong unitary hierarchical control for each executive within their do-
main, a point about which we are agnostic. Ensuring intrapolicy un-
iformity, however, does not require a single executive.
6. Coordination.
The concern about coordination, in our view, is quite different
from uniformity in that it focuses on interpolicy effects rather than
intrapolicy effects as uniformity does. The simple underlying claim is
that a single strong executive will be better able to coordinate related
policies and make sensible tradeoffs across those policies. If coordina-
tion is the overriding principle of government organization, then the
unbundled executive is likely worse than a single strong unitary ex-
ecutive. Although we are open to clever counterarguments, we will
assume that a single executive with responsibility for j policy dimen-
sions will be better able to coordinate across dimensions. If interpolicy
coordination is more important than accountability, uniformity, ener-
gy, or efficiency, then perhaps institutional designers should reject the
unbundled executive. If coordination is one value among many, then
the calculus is far more complicated and does not obviously disfavor
the unbundled model.
65 See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 11
(Harvard 1993) (describing tunnel vision as "a classic administrative disease [that] arises when
an agency so organizes or subdivides its tasks that each employee's individual conscientious
performance effectively carries single-minded pursuit of a single goal too far, to the point where
it brings about more harm than good").
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Although coordination is a laudable goal, it clearly is not the only
constitutional value at issue. Congress has enacted, the president has
signed, and the Supreme Court has upheld a series of institutional
arrangements that are arguably inconsistent with the strong unitary
executive position. Although these cases have generated enormous
debate, current doctrine upholds as constitutional independent prose-
cutors6 and the insulation from plenary presidential control of agency
61heads who are not pure or core executive officers. The Constitution,
as applied, has already sacrificed the pure goal of coordination in the
service of other competing principles.
We will leave the debate about whether this sacrifice is desirable
to others. Still, compared to the current state of affairs, the unbundled
executive is likely superior on interpolicy coordination grounds. The
ultimate principal-the public-would select and sanction each of the
specialized executives. This arrangement gives the public better me-
chanisms for ensuring interpolicy coordination compared with a sys-
tem in which the president appoints but cannot remove agency heads.
Thus, as a comparative matter, the unbundled executive might be pre-
ferable on coordination grounds to the current state of affairs, even if
a strong unitary executive with plenary control of the administration
would be a first-best alternative along this one dimension.
It is also a mistake to conflate or equate centralization and coor-
dination. Centralization is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condi-
tion for coordination. Strong vertical control over subordinates may
facilitate coordination, but there seems to be no shortage of lackadais-
ical supervisors in the world. Moreover, the key to effective coordina-
tion is accurate information. The centralized official, for example the
chief executive, must generally depend on information provided by
the very decentralized agents (or agencies) that are to be coordinated.
Because agency preferences diverge from the coordinated outcome
(or else there is no need for centralized control), there is a risk that
biased information will be generated, undermining the coordination
benefit of centralization."
66 See Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654,659-60 (1988).
67 See Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361,409 (1989) (sentencing commissioners); Wiener v
United States, 357 US 349, 356 (1958) (War Claims Commission). See also Humphrey's Executor v
United States, 295 US 602, 629 (1935) (concluding that the president does not have unlimited re-
moval power over individuals who serve in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial position). But see
Myers v United States, 272 US 52, 176 (1926) (holding that the president's right to remove officers
who he appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate cannot be restricted by Congress).
68 See generally Ricardo Alonso, Wouter Dessein, and Niko Matouschek, When Does
Coordination Require Centralization?, 98 Am Econ Rev 145 (2008).
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C. Strong Unitarians and Unbundled Executives
The unitary executive fight is often miscast in politics and the
media. In constitutional law it has little to do with the breadth of pres-
idential authority. Although many constitutional theorists have strong
views about how broad executive authority is or should be, we abstract
away from this debate entirely. Whatever one's view about the proper
scope of executive authority, there is always a subsequent question
about how that authority should be optimally structured. A constitu-
tion could establish a plural executive with broad authority or a unitary
executive with narrow authority. A constitution could unbundle execu-
tive authority irrespective of the stock or scope of executive authority.
Properly understood, the unitary executive debate is simply about
the extent of hierarchical control over executive or administrative
officers that the Constitution establishes. 9 In the US context, virtually
everyone favors a unitary executive of one sort or another." The key
distinction is between "strong" unitary executives and "weak" unitary
executives.7' There are many nuances in individual views within vari-
ous camps, but strong unitary executive types tend to believe that
Congress cannot insulate administrative officers from presidential con-
trol, for example, by only allowing removal for cause. Weak unitary
executives tend to believe that the president must have plenary con-
69 The Supreme Court has said that Congress may not restrict the president's ability to re-
move purely executive officers. See Myers, 272 US at 176. Congress may not reserve for itself the
authority to remove an executive officer by means other than impeachment. It is also apparently
impermissible for Congress to specify a list of potential nominees from which the president may
choose. It is not clear that no variant of this arrangement would be constitutional. However, the
list method in combination with other features of the appointment and authority scheme was
rejected in Hechinger v Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 36 F3d 97, 104 (DC Cir 1994)
(explaining that there is a difference between Congress maintaining an influential role over agen-
cies and creating a structural relationship that allows Congress to coerce the agency). The Su-
preme Court rejected a similar scheme in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v Citizens
for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. See 501 US 252 (1991) (calling the scheme an "imper-
missible encroachment"). See generally Jack M. Beermann, CongressionalAdministration, 43 San
Diego L Rev 61 (2006). But this default appointment and removal scheme does not begin to
constitute the full range of possibilities, either theoretically or empirically. Suppose Congress was
given the authority to appoint members of the president's cabinet or other agency heads. Alter-
natively, suppose the legislature was given no role in the appointment of these officials; either
the president might select unilaterally or the nominee might be subject to confirmation by
another political institution, perhaps a nonpartisan board or commission.
70 See, for example, Terry Eastland, Energy in the Executive: The Case for the Strong Ex-
ecutive 2 (Free Press 1992). But see, for example, Michael Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the
Modern State, 144 U Pa L Rev 827, 892 (1996) (critiquing some of the rationale for supporting a
strong unitary executive and explaining how a strong unitary executive structure creates political
challenges for the president); Flaherty, 105 Yale L J at 1821 (cited in note 18) (discussing the
evolution of the separation of powers doctrine throughout US history and explaining how the
result of this shift has given extensive powers to the executive).
71 See Lessig and Sunstein, 94 Colum L Rev at 8 (cited in note 18).
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trol over certain principal purely executive officers, but that officers
who exercise authority that is not purely executive can be insulated to
a greater or lesser extent.
To oversimplify just a bit, there are two main types of justifications
for a strong unitary executive. The first is historical or originalist: be-
cause the constitutional structure would have been understood at the
time of the founding to create a strong unitary executive, that is the
meaning that the Constitution should be given." The second is more or
less consequentialist:4 because of other shifts in government behavior
and social development, a strong unitary executive is laudable since it
would help support a desirable constitutional structure."
As should be evident by now, there is much overlap between the
justifications for a unitary executive and justifications for a single ex-
ecutive. Therefore many of the normative justifications for the strong
unitary executive position are natural counterpoints to our model of
an unbundled executive. Although we suspect that most strong unitary
executives would oppose the unbundled executive, in our view the
positions are not conceptually inconsistent, at least setting aside the
originalist or historical justification. To the extent that one favors
strong hierarchical control of executive subordinates, it is possible to
favor an unbundled executive in which each executive exerts complete
vertical control. Each unbundled executive could remove subordi-
nates at will, veto policy judgments, or even substitute his own judg-
ment in lieu of a subordinate officer's.
We have said nothing about whether this strong form of vertical
control is desirable. If it is (according to some external theory of ex-
ecutive authority), one could favor a strong unitary unbundled execu-
tive system. if not, one could favor a weak unitary unbundled execu-
tive system. Executive authority would be unbundled, but indepen-
dent agencies and officers would still exist. The modest conceptual
point is that the degree of vertical control of an executive over subor-
dinates is distinct from the existence or extent of unbundling in the
executive. Moreover, if we are correct that the unbundled executive
better serves the underlying principles that unitary executives claim as
their own, the case for the unbundled executive is all the stronger.
72 Id at 8-9.
73 See, for example, Calabresi and Prakash, 104 Yale L J at 599 (cited in note 18).
74 One could also hold originalist interpretive sympathies on pragmatic grounds See gen-
erally, for example, John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Origi-
nalism, 101 Nw U L Rev 383 (2007).
75 See, for example, Lessig and Sunstein, 94 Colum L Rev at 3 (cited in note 18) (explain-
ing that although the Constitution does not require it, there is a nonhistorical argument for a
strong unitary executive); Flaherty, 105 Yale L J at 1811 (cited in note 18).
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There is a sense, however, in which the unbundled executive is at
least in tension with the unitary executive position. A dominant, if not
the dominant, pragmatic justification for a unitary executive is that
only a single executive with control over all implementation of federal
law is democratically accountable. Insofar as this is merely a claim that
a single unitary executive is more democratically accountable than a
single executive combined with independent agencies, it could-but
16
need not-be right. Insofar as it is a statement that a single unitary is
more accountable than any divided or plural executive structure, we
obviously disagree. The partially unbundled executive should produce
greater accountability than the single unitary executive vision.
D. Weak Unitarians and Unbundling
To this point, we have suggested that unitary executive types should
actually prefer (or at least not despise) the unbundled executive regime
because it performs as well or better along the very dimensions that
supposedly justify a single unitary executive. While the strong unitary
executive camp is vocal, it is probably wrong to describe it as a majori-
ty position, either in academia or politics. What of weak unitary execu-
tive types, who are willing to tolerate if not embrace independent agen-
cies and officers who the president cannot remove except for causef
Again, properly understood, the unitary executive camp is mainly
concerned with vertical control, and therefore one can favor the un-
bundled executive independent of one's views on unitary structure.
Nonetheless, to the extent that weak unitary executives support many
of the same principles that strong unitary executives do, all that we have
said above applies here as well. What is different for weak unitary ex-
ecutives is support for a lack of complete presidential control over some
administrative officers. This position could mean: (a) some agencies or
officers should be beyond the control of any executive; or (b) some
agencies or officers should be beyond the control of the executive.
This ambiguity is not usually evidenced, because in the US sys-
tem, we only have one president. But once the possibility of several
executives is on the table, there is some vagueness in the weak unitary
executive position. For example, suppose one favors independent mem-
bers of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) or the National La-
76 See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107
Mich L Rev 53 (2008) (arguing that a single executive does not always represent voter prefe-
rences better than an independent agency because the policy position of the executive favors
some voters over others).
77 See generally Marshall J. Breger and Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory
and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 Admin L Rev 1111 (2000) (surveying the
evolution of growing acquiescence to independent agencies among weak unitarians).
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bor Relations Board (NLRB), where independent means that the
president cannot remove a commissioner without cause. If one likes
independence because it insulates policy decisions from voters (by
weakening presidential control), then having a directly elected labor
executive or election executive who makes those policy decisions will
look unattractive. Unbundling gives greater control to voters, which
(by assumption in the political insulation view) is a state of affairs to
be avoided. By the same token, if the important feature of executive-
commissioner relations is presidential "selection" of independent
commissioners, this could be accomplished with an unbundled execu-
tive regime as well. The directly elected labor executive would appoint
NLRB members who would then only be removable for cause. This is
an example of a hybrid unbundling and insulation regime.78 If, accord-
ing to some external theory of good governance, political insulation is
desirable, the unbundled executive regime is flexible enough to ac-
complish it. Moreover, the unbundled labor executive is likely to have
more policy-specific expertise and therefore to select better commis-
sioners, which could in turn increase the average quality of decision-
making within independent agencies.
Alternatively, if one favors independent agencies in the current
system because some policy decisions should be made by actors with
local policy expertise who are not subject to generalist political pres-
sure, then conceivably one might prefer doubly unbundled executives
without political insulation. FEC commissioners could themselves be
either directly elected by the public or, more likely, selected by a di-
rectly elected executive, who could then remove them for any reason
or no reason at all. Again, the unbundled executive regime accom-
plishes the relevant goals as well as or better than the current single
executive with independent officers regime.
E. Unbundling, Concentration, and Dispersion
Although advocates of a strong executive are many, there is also a
storied tradition in political theory and law that is suspicious of the
concentration of authority in one institutional actor like the president,
or more apropos an even stronger executive like a dictator.9 Dispers-
ing authority among multiple institutions is generally thought to be a
78 Consider Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-administrative Im-
pulse, 103 Mich L Rev 2073, 2119-20 (2005) (critiquing arguments that accountability is most
effective in direct election or delegation to local institutions and instead suggesting that accoun-
tability is most effective in a structure of administrative bureaucracy).
79 See generally, for example, Arend Liphart, Patterns of Democracy (Yale 1999).
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key strength of the US separation of powers system.8' By requiring
multiple actors to sign onto controversial government actions, dispers-
ing government authority allegedly protects citizens. The dark side of
dispersion, long appreciated, is that the benefits of efficiency and
speed (and perhaps expertise) are forgone.8 ' As a matter of institu-
tional design, there is obviously a tradeoff between these values; the
optimal balance will depend on time and place.82 Many debates about
the structure of executive authority are cast in terms of the centraliza-
tion of authority. This is true of the federal US context, but it is also
true of the comparative literature3 and some very early work on state
government structure in the 1950s and 1960s. Political scientists and
lawyers have long studied how different constitutional structures, such
as presidential versus parliamentary systems, produce different politi-
cal outcomes." More recently, economists have estimated the effect of
different constitutional structures on economic policy, development,
taxing, or spending.8
80 The concentration versus dispersion theme also has close parallels in work on redun-
dancy in bureaucratic organizations. See Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart
Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 Cal L Rev 1655,
1676-79 (2006) (setting forth a list of benefits of redundancy and applying this benefits analysis
to the context of administrative agencies).
81 See Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 16 (cited in note 55).
82 See Flaherty, 105 Yale L J at 1776-77 (cited in note 18) (disputing a strict formalist in-
terpretation of separation of powers, as presented by Calabresi and Prakash, and concluding that
at the time of the founding, "'separation of powers' and related terminology were malleable").
83 See generally Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitu-
tions (MIT 2003); Persson and Tabellini, Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy (cited
in note 27).
84 See, for example, Thomas R. Dye, Executive Power and Public Policy in the States, 22 W
Polit Q 926, 932 (1969) (exploring the relationship between executive "fragmentation" and pub-
lic policy at the state level).
85 See generally Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (cited in note 79); Alberto Alesina and
Nouriel Roubini, with Gerald D. Cohen, Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy (MIT 1997)
(discussing "how the timing of elections, the ideological orientation of governments, and compe-
tition among political parties influences unemployment, economic growth, inflation, and various
monetary and fiscal policy instruments"); Roger Myerson, Theoretical Comparison of Electoral
Systems, 43 Eur Econ Rev 671 (1999); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents
and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge 1992); G. Bingham
Powell, Jr., Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence (Harvard 1982).
86 See Torsten Persson, Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?, 70 Econometrica
883,902-03 (2002); Alessandro Lizaeri and Nicola Persico, The Provision of Public Goods under
Alternative Electoral Incentives, 91 Am Econ Rev 225, 226 (2001) (assessing targetability and
efficiency in the distribution of public goods in competing electoral systems); Rolf R. Strauch and
Jurgen von Hagen, eds, Institutions, Politics and Fiscal Policy (Kluwer 2000); Allen Drazen, Polit-
ical Economy in Macroeconomics 21-22 (Princeton 2000); Torsten Persson, Gerard Roland, and
Guido Tabellini, Comparative Politics and Public Finance, 108 J Polit Econ 1121, 1122, 1152 (2000)
(finding that parliamentary regimes result in larger government as compared to presidential-
congressional regimes); Dani Rodrik, Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?,
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What of these scholars who distrust the centralization of authori-
ty? How should they receive the unbundled executive? Whether this
group of scholars should favor the unbundled executive depends on
precisely what is to be accomplished by decentralizing authority. This
is not always fleshed out with sufficient clarity, but one camp seems to
be concerned with the sum of all power that is given to one executive
or government official. Too much centralization, on this view, really
implies too much power in one place. For supporters of this position,
our theory has much to recommend it. By definition, the unbundled
executive regime carves up general executive authority and gives it
exclusively to different executive officers. As a consequence, the ag-
gregate executive power held by any one individual in our regime is
less than the aggregate executive power held by any individual in the
single executive regime. The unbundled executive is as good as any
other fragmentation or decentralization scheme in this regard, and, for
the various reasons we emphasize, potentially much better.
An alternative understanding of executive fragmentation, how-
ever, is concerned not so much with aggregate authority, but with the
lack of veto points that a single executive with centralized authority
must negotiate. On this view, the problem is not that one executive can
exercise power over a lot of things, but that one executive can exercise
power over the objection of other government officials without obtain-
ing their assent. When scholars of this ilk advocate fragmentation, they
are really advocating councils or committees -multimember decision-
making bodies-in which the consent of all or most members is needed
for executive action. Although this is not the majority position in the
fragmentation literature, for one who holds this view, the unbundled
executive is not likely to be significantly more attractive than the cur-
rent regime. To see why, recall that exclusive policy authority within a
domain is a critical element of the unbundled executive model. It is the
lack of necessary consent from other executives that supports greater
accountability in the model because there is clarity rather than ambigui-
ty about which official is responsible for which policy. That said, the un-
bundled executive is no worse on this front than the current regime;
each allows one executive official to exercise complete policymaking
authority. And to the extent that any background concerns about the
centralization of too much power in one place linger in the shadows, the
unbundled executive might still be preferred on those grounds.
106 J Polit Econ 997, 998 (1998) (finding a positive and robust correlation between openness in
trading and government expenditure).
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The unbundled executive then does both more and less in avoid-
ing the concentration of executive authority. It does less in the sense
that an unbundled executive could have extremely broad authority to
act in a given domain, say the field of national defense, without assent
from other political institutions. The unbundled executive does more
because it enhances democratic control over both the specialized ex-
ecutive and the generalized executive. It does not make it harder for
unbundled executives to act, but it does make it easier for the public
to monitor, reward, and sanction those actions.
F. Selection Effects
We have focused predominantly on incentive effects: how does
the unbundling executive authority alter the behavior of executives?
We have also discussed first order selection effects: how does the un-
bundled executive affect the ability of voters to select effectively good
types for elected office? This section addresses selection effects in
greater detail. Would an unbundled plural executive scheme attract or
select different candidates to executive positions and would any
changes be normatively attractive or disheartening?" The dynamics that
generate such effects are likely to be complex, and we do not want to
present a false sense of certainty. Nonetheless, some tentative observa-
tions are warranted.
It is possible, but we think unlikely, that the unbundled executive
would produce no new selection effects. In this world, all the unbun-
dled executives would look essentially the same as the single bundled
executive. For this to occur there would have to be near perfect over-
lap in the characteristics that make for a good executive across all pol-
icy domains. The same attributes that make for a good education ex-
ecutive would have to make for a good war-powers executive. No
doubt, there will be some overlap -for example the ability to inspire.
But the characteristics that make one a good wartime leader are not
necessarily those that make for a good peacetime leader.9 The greater
the overlap across domains, the less the selection benefit of the un-
87 See generally Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 Va L Rev 953
(2005) (discussing how different constitutional rules generate incentives for good or bad actors
to enter government).
88 See Fearon, Electoral Accountability, in Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin, eds, Democracy,
Accountability, and Representation 55, 56 (cited in note 34). In political science, it has now be-
come the norm to emphasize selection effects of elections. We focus on both types of effects with
respect to executive officials as both seem crucial for any sensible regime of executive structure.
89 In fact, it seems likely the constraint of only selecting one executive has created an
artificial tradeoff between policy dimensions like these. The unbundled executive regime would
reduce some of these necessary tradeoffs, likely producing more effective military executives and
more effective domestic policy executives, or so we argue.
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bundled executive. The unbundled executive regime would almost
certainly produce some executives who have attributes quite different
from the general purpose executive. As discussed above, the unbun-
died executive requires fewer tradeoffs regarding ability or expertise
across executive domains.
Would the unbundled executive regime attract a different popu-
lation of potential executive candidates to run for executive office?
Suppose potential presidential candidates are attracted to the possibil-
ity of being the leader of the free world rather than one of a handful of
leaders of the free world. The unbundled executive might drive some
candidates away from executive elections. This is a possible effect, but
if it exists it tends to support rather than undermine the case for an
unbundled executive.
First, it is not at all clear that having six unbundled executives
would make the office(s) significantly less attractive to qualified appli-
cants. Those who run for president in the United States are often for-
mer senators, representatives, and governors. If the potential candi-
dates came from Congress, the prospect of being one of many power-
ful national leaders was not a sufficient disincentive to drive them
from public life. If the candidate were a former governor, recall that
most state executives are already somewhat unbundled. If unbundling
in the state government context nonetheless attracts high quality can-
didates to public life, we are hard pressed to see why unbundling in
the national government context would not do so. Of course, perhaps
part of what makes serving in Congress or state governorships attrac-
tive is the possibility of moving on to higher office; maybe if the presi-
dency were unbundled even those offices would be less attractive?
Again, this is possible, but barely so. The probability of winning the
presidency is sufficiently small for any senator, congressman, or state
governor that adjusting the expected reward of winning an executive
election seems unlikely to produce anything but an inframarginal se-
lection effect for these officials.
It is also often said that governors make good presidents because
they have prior executive experience. The unbundled executive re-
gime would produce a larger pool of candidates with some executive
experience in national government; perhaps this would make presi-
dential races more competitive, creating ever stronger executive can-
didates. In countries where the chief government executive is signifi-
cantly weaker than the president is in the United States, there is no
evidence that systematically lower quality politicians serve. Without
entering irresolvable political debates, it seems safe to say that prime
ministers in the United Kingdom are not of systematically lower qual-
ity than presidents in the United States. If one peruses the list of
prominent world leaders in the past two hundred years, it is hard to
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see an obvious trend as to intellect, strength, and leadership that is
correlated with the presence of presidential or parliamentary systems.
If the unbundled executive does attract a different pool of candidates
to run for office, it is hard to imagine that the new pool would be of
systematically lower quality.
Still, to make any rigorous progress on the selection effect prob-
lem, we need to know whether the unbundled executive reduces the
probability of selecting a truly great executive (the top part of the po-
tential executive distribution), reduces the probability of screening out
the worst executives (eliminating the bottom portion of the distribution),
and raises or lowers the median or average executive elected. If the
unbundled executive screens out the best potential executives or selects
the worst potential executives, that would be a significant problem.
The candidates most likely to run for president in the current re-
gime who would not do so in the unbundled regime are likely to be can-
didates for whom aggregate power is the most important concern. These
candidates prize being the person in control of everything. Perhaps this
group of candidates makes for especially good presidents, but they
seem to have most in common with megalomaniacs. In other countries,
this would be a group of likely dictators, not responsive and responsible
officials. Making the election of megalomaniacs or aspiring dictators
less likely hardly seems a mark of shame for any executive regime.
What about the top of the distribution? Would the unbundled ex-
ecutive still manage to select the best candidates? No electoral system
is perfect, but there are good reasons to suspect the unbundled execu-
tive would perform better on this front than the bundled regime. In-
deed, this is part of the beauty of the unbundled executive regime. In a
world with a single executive, voters must trade off desirable executive
attributes on less important dimensions for desirable attributes on
more important dimensions. The unbundled regime requires fewer of
these tradeoffs. Voters need not find a single person who is strong and
wise and compassionate and so on; citizens can tailor the importance
of a single executive attribute to a single policy domain. This should
make for higher quality executives along each dimension. Not only are
voters better able to calibrate, but potential executives who could not
win a general executive election-because of the tradeoff problem-
may now run for executive office. A candidate who cannot look "tough
on crime" and would therefore not run for president might run for
education executive in the unbundled regime. The unbundled execu-
tive regime should do a better job of selecting the right potential ex-
ecutive and should encourage higher quality candidates to enter ex-
ecutive politics than does the current regime. Therefore, the average
executive quality within a domain would likely rise. Although it is poss-
ible that in some select domains the unbundled regime would select
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worse executives, on balance, the net selection effects are either quite
positive or negligible.
III. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
The burden of persuasion for this Article is significant, but what if
all we have said thus far is correct and the unbundled executive would
outperform the current bundled executive? Would this revision to the
constitutional order generate other collateral consequences that are
clearly undesirable? The answer to this question is yes and no. Adopt-
ing an unbundled executive would produce collateral consequences
for the constitutional structure. Some of these of these are desirable;
others are undesirable but straightforward enough to remedy with
other relatively minor institutional adjustments. The relevant thought
experiment is to maintain the basic contours of the US Constitution
and compare the current perfectly bundled executive to a partially un-
bundled executive. The list of collateral consequences we consider be-
low is not exhaustive, but it does include the more prominent concerns.
A. Separation of Powers
Suppose Article II was altered to create an unbundled executive.
What are the implications for separation of powers principles? If the
concern is balance of powers, then so long as the scope or breadth of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers are held constant, the unbun-
dled executive does not disrupt whatever parity of powers does (or
does not) exist in the current system. The executive might have too
much or too little power vis-A-vis Congress today, but the unbundled
executive would not upset this balance. Tne unbundied executive need
not aggrandize or decrease the aggregate amount of executive authority.
A related separation of powers problem is avoiding encroachment
by one branch on the institutional prerogatives of another branch.
Along this dimension, the unbundled executive might actually fare bet-
ter. Elected executives with responsibility for only one policy dimension
would be less likely (because less able) to trade legislative encroach-
ments in one policy area for executive gains in another. That is, the
unbundled executive helps avoid legislative encroachments achieved by
bargain rather than by fiat.90 The overwhelming majority of recent
90 Virtually all modem separation of powers cases are the result of a consensual bargain
between the president and Congress. The cases challenge statutes passed by Congress and signed
by the president. Characterizing most of these as power grabs by the legislature or the president
is awkward since both institutions consented. This is not to say that such arrangements are or
ought to be permitted by the Constitution. But it is important to bear in mind that the unpermit-
ted arrangements are generally supported by Congress and the executive.
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prominent separation of powers cases like Bowsher v Synar9l or INS v
Chadha2 involve consensual arrangements between the legislative and
executive branches-not unilateral power grabs. If these arrangements
are unconstitutional, then the unbundled executive serves a kind of pre-
judicial enforcement function, making it less likely that judges will be
called on to strike down statutory agreements between the executive
and the legislature. Violations of separation of powers principles tend
to occur with the consent of two branches rather than unilateral incur-
sion by one. If the unbundled executive prevents even some of these,
branch relations would be improved because courts would be called on
less often to invalidate the judgments of the other branches.
However, because the unbundled executive increases public con-
trol over executive policy, there is a sense in which the unbundled ex-
ecutive is more constrained than the bundled executive. It seems awk-
ward to call this executive weaker instead of more accountable, but
for the sake of argument suppose unbundling does make the execu-
tive less powerful relative to the legislature. The unbundled executive
still does not produce legislative dominance.
The reason is that the extent of unbundling in the executive branch
is not the only dimension along which institutional arrangements can
be adjusted. The unbundled executive could easily be adjusted to prec-
lude independent officers-that is to create stronger unitary control
that would enhance the power of various unbundled executives. Other
alternatives might also ratchet up executive power to compensate eas-
ily for any marginal reduction stemming from unbundling. More im-
portantly, the extent of executive power has grown exponentially since
the founding. Congress's powers have grown, but clearly at a less rapid
pace. If the Founders's intent was to produce an initial balance or pari-
ty among the branches, surely it is the executive branch's power that is
now out of whack. If the unbundled executive weakens the executive
branch-although again, we think it does not-it might actually bring
the branches closer to parity, bringing the balance of power closer to
that originally contemplated, and in the process enhancing the degree
of accountability in the executive branch.
91 478 US 714,736 (1986) (holding that the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Con-
trol Act of 1985 violated the separation of powers doctrine because the Comptroller General
was responsible for the execution of the laws but was removable only by Congress).
92 462 US 919,951-59 (1983) (holding that one house of Congress striking down an act by
an executive official was inconsistent with the separation of powers doctrine).
93 Presumably, these agreements make both branches better off and therefore preventing
them may be worse for both institutions. However, that is also the case anytime the courts strike
down an otherwise valid statute on separation of powers grounds.
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B. Presentment
The unbundled executive also raises novel questions about other
constitutional provisions. For example, Article I, § 7 requires bicameral-
ism and presentment to enact a valid law.94 With multiple executives,
who would sign? All the executives? None? One? Questions like these
are far from the path on which we started, and therefore our views are
necessarily tentative. However, several scenarios are possible.
Most simply, an institutional actor like the House or Senate par-
liamentarian could designate the executive with the relevant policy
authority. Transportation legislation would be signed by the transpor-
tation executive. Military legislation signed by the military executive.
This could create the opportunity for gaming, of course. Legislation
could be framed as a transportation bill when in fact it was a welfare
bill. But these are standard problems within Congress already. House
and Senate rules typically require that legislation be referred to the
committee with the most relevant jurisdiction." Historically some gam-
ing emerged, but for the most part, committees guard their turf and bills
are sent to the appropriate legislative body. Legislative precedents and
norms generally have been sufficient to prevent a breakdown of the
rules. If the practice works reasonably well within Congress, there is
no reason to think it would work substantially worse across branches.
Even better would be to designate links between congressional
committees and special unbundled executives ex ante. Then decisions
about which committee to send a bill to would produce an automatic
decision about to which executive the bill must be presented. Here too
there could be gamesmanship, but these initial decisions would be
made behind the veil, so to speak, making strategic behavior much
more difficult. Although our informal intuition is that these problems
are not nearly as severe as others that plague the current state of af-
fairs, our system cannot avoid them entirely. Still, the unbundled ex-
ecutive entails a straightforward method of disciplining such behavior.
If the transportation executive signs welfare legislation, and if voters
care, it is easier to express displeasure with electoral sanctions in the
unbundled executive world than in the bundled executive world.
94 US Const Art 1, § 7.
95 See, for example, Rule XVII, Standing Rules of the Senate, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (Sept
14, 2007), online at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/Rules091407.pdf (visited Aug 29, 2008)
(setting forth procedure for assigning matters to the appropriate committee); Rule XII(2)(a),
Rules of the House of Representatives, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (Mar 11, 2008), online at
http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/110th.pdf (visited Aug 29, 2008) (stipulating that each mat-
ter be referred to the committee with responsibility for that subject).
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C. Logrolls
If unbundled executives could only sign legislation within their
policy domain, would that not eliminate the possibility of logrolls and
omnibus legislation? To start, within a policy domain, big legislative
packages and logrolls would still be possible. Therefore, it seems likely
that the current practice of enacting big transportation bills or farm
bills every several years would continue; such legislative packages do
contain and would continue to contain plenty of logrolls and side deals,
for better or for worse.9
Across policy domains, however, logrolls and omnibus legislation
would be marginally more difficult. This does not seem especially trag-
ic and there are those who would applaud the effect. State constitu-
tions regularly restrict bills to a single subject and prohibit the mixing
of appropriations legislation and substantive legislation. Some logrolls,
however, are welfare-enhancing, not wasteful. When the minority that
benefits from a provision benefits a great deal, oftentimes a logroll
will be welfare-enhancing. If interpolicy logrolls are especially impor-
tant according to some external theory of the good, then the unbun-
dled regime could be adjusted to allow for them. Consider the follow-
ing proposal: legislation covering two policy domains must be pre-
sented to both the relevant executives. If both sign, the bill becomes
law. If neither signs, the legislature could override the veto with a su-
permajority vote of two-thirds. If one executive signs and the other
does not, the legislature could override the single veto with a vote of
three-fifths (or some other lesser supermajority variant). Upon more
serious consideration, these alternative regimes might be good or bad,
but the basic unbundled executive structure is flexible enough to in-
corporate them if desirable.
D. Administrative Agencies
Although the executive has many important duties, managing ad-
ministrative agencies and regulatory policy is surely near the top of
the list. Would the unbundled executive turn administrative law and
regulatory policy into morass? We cannot say that there would be no
complications, but the most obvious trouble spots do not suggest a
drastic institutional overhaul would be necessary.
96 The single-subject limitation is supposed to preclude logrolls in which policies favored
only by a minority of politicians or voters are enacted together. See Gilbert, 67 U Pitt L Rev at
813-15 (cited in note 38) (discussing logrolling as "the principal evil that single subject rules seek
to check"); Dragich, 38 Harv J on Legis at 114-16 (cited in note 38) (explaining and describing
the purpose and objective of single-subject rules).
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First, consider the dominant trend over the past several decades
toward more centralization and coordination of administrative agen-
cies.9W Does this not suggest we are swimming upstream in current even
stronger than it first appears? Not necessarily. One of the main justifi-
cations for increasing presidential control over agencies is to increase
democratic accountability.9 The president is directly elected by a na-
tional constituency and agency heads are not. More presidential con-
trol over agencies is more democratic, better ensuring majoritarian
preferences in regulatory policy.' Of course, in the unbundled execu-
tive world, each executive is directly elected. A directly elected envi-
ronment executive is vastly more democratically accountable than a
single general purpose executive who oversees environmental policy-
along with hundreds of other policies -indirectly. To the extent that
centralization of administrative oversight seeks to make agency policy
more democratic, the unbundled executive is likely more effective.
The other main pragmatic justification given for centralized con-
trol of the bureaucracy is the need for interpolicy tradeoffs- a specific
type of coordination problem. Just as agencies with a single mission
might pursue policy goals with blinders, so too might unbundled execu-
tives.'00 A lack of coordination could produce bad policy, although
whether it would typically produce policy that is better or worse on av-
erage seems to be an open question. The simplest thing to say is that
this is a genuine cost. The comparative advantage of the unbundled ex-
ecutive, however, is that if the public is upset that some unbundled ex-
ecutive is pursuing policy goals too single-mindedly, then the public can
vote that person out of office. The relevant unbundled executive has
done a bad job; our structure provides a more effective way to correct
this problem than the current bundled structure. So far as we are aware,
however, no president in the current regime has lost an election because
of the failure to make efficient interpolicy tradeoffs in regulatory policy.
97 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv L Rev 2245, 2282-346 (2001)
(documenting and defending the extensive mechanisms by which presidents exert control over
administrative agencies). See also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative
Law, 107 Colum L Rev 1749, 1763-65 (2007); Nicholas Bagley and Richard L. Revesz, Centra-
lized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 Colum L Rev 1260, 1312-14 (2006) (disputing the
emerging consensus in the administrative law literature that OMB review is simply one more
neutral tool that the president can use to further her administration's agenda).
98 But see Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel before
a New President Arrives, 78 NYU L Rev 557, 604 (2003) (arguing that policies may be less majorita-
rian if old presidents can entrench policies); Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U Pa L
Rev 711,758 (2001) ("[M]any observers tend to over-estimate the significance of election&").
99 But see generally Stephenson, 107 Mich L Rev 53 (cited in note 76) (suggesting that
executive control may favor voters with some policy preferences).
100 See Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 11 (cited in note 65).
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Another alternative, which we note only in passing, would be to
create an interpolicy tradeoff executive. Her specific policy domain
would be interpolicy or interrisk trades and nothing else. A public fru-
strated with the tunnel vision of unbundled executives could either
discipline the executive behaving with tunnel vision or discipline the
coordinating executive. In effect, there could be an unbundled execu-
tive in charge of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA)."' The details of whether the OIRA executive could veto or
initiate new rules would have to be worked out, and we certainly have
not done so. However, we suspect one could do so in a sensible way
that would not debilitate either the administrative state or the unbun-
died executive scheme. The downside, of course, is that this latter
structure would reduce clarity about which executive is responsible
for policy failure, making it harder for voters to sanction the right offi-
cial with genuine confidence.
The unbundled executive might even help solve some standard
problems in administrative law. For example, it has long been unclear
how courts should deal with deference to agencies with overlapping
jurisdiction."" Standard deference doctrines encourage courts to defer
to agencies, but when agencies share jurisdiction, courts must decide
to which agency deference is owed. In the current regime, this is a
problem mainly because of overlapping regulatory jurisdiction; it is
easy to solve by creating agency jurisdiction that is exclusive rather
than shared! The unbundled executive with exclusive policy authori-
ty actually solves this Chevron problem. There is a clear institutional
actor-the given unbundled executive-to whom deference is owed
or not, as standard deference doctrine dictates. By trending towards,
indeed by requiring, exclusive policy jurisdiction, the unbundled ex-
ecutive would help resolve them.
E. Majoritarianism and Minoritarianism
A major advantage of the unbundled executive is greater demo-
cratic responsiveness: the structure enhances accountability. Another
line of attack on the unbundled executive would go as follows. Institu-
101 See Bagley and Revesz, 106 Colum L Rev at 1304-10 (cited in note 97) (concluding that
the role of OIRA in the administrative state cannot be justified by reference to the checking
function that has been its hallmark since its inception).
102 See Gersen, 2006 S Ct Rev at 202-03 (cited in note 53).
103 Id at 208 (arguing that Congress might intentionally generate exclusive or concurrent
agency jurisdiction to encourage or discourage agencies from regulating in new policy domains).
104 See Chevron US.A., Inc v NRDC, 467 US 837,844 (1984) (requiring courts to give "con-
siderable weight" to agency interpretations of statutes in the event that Congress has expressly
delegated regulatory authority). For a more elaborate discussion, see generally Jacob E. Gersen
and Adrian Vermeule, Chevron As a Voting Rule, 116 Yale L J 676 (2007).
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tional design in a constitutional democracy must balance many goals.
The Constitution is hardly a majoritarian document. It is riddled with
provisions that make it harder rather than easier to enact majoritarian
views, including bicameralism and presentment. Protecting minority
views is an important constitutional value that competes with pure
majority preferences, and the unbundled executive could produce too
much accountability.
We agree that the Constitution does and should balance the imple-
mentation of majoritarian views with the protection of minority posi-
tions. If the existing Constitution gets the mix exactly right, then any
deviation towards more or less accountability would be suboptimal,
our proposal included. However, there is a way in which the unbun-
dled executive is, or could be, minoritarian, albeit in a subtle way. Re-
call that as executive authority is unbundled, there is a corresponding
increase in monitoring costs. Suppose executive authority was unbun-
dled such that there were twenty executives. When policy issues are
unbundled by creating specialized executives with exclusive authority
to make policy, the costs of participation for voters, for example,
through gathering information and voting, increase. A plausible infe-
rence is that as a result of increasing costs, participation will be lower
in unbundled elections than bundled elections or that there might be a
falloff such that voters vote for some but not all of the unbundled ex-
ecutives on the ballot. 5 A given citizen will be more likely to partici-
pate in the executive election for the issue she cares about most. Citi-
zens with high interest in the issue are more likely to constitute a ma-
jority of voters for the given unbundled executive office, even if they
are a minority of all voters. This is essentially a selective participation
effect, in which minorities will control elections (and by extension
outcomes) in the policy domains they care most about. This result is
not inevitable, but it is entirely plausible. Thus, while the general
theme of the unbundled executive is majoritarian, there are scenarios
in which the unbundled executive can protect and even enhance the
ability of minorities to control politics most important to their lives.
F. Emergencies and Change
Much of our analysis is static in an important sense. It assumes that
the relevant policy dimensions can be identified ex ante and that a
specific unbundled executive could be elected to control those poli-
105 There is empirical evidence to support the supposition that participation is selective in
unbundled elections. For example, Terry Moe has shown that teachers' union members are up to
seven times more likely to participate in school board elections than the average registered voter.
See Terry M. Moe, Political Control and the Power of the Agent, 22 J L, Econ, & Org 1, 22 (2006).
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cies. In the real world, things are not so straightforward. New policy
dimensions emerge; others fade away. When there is but one general
purpose executive, these shifts take care of themselves. When authori-
ty is unbundled, matters are more complicated. If the bundled execu-
tive is better able to adapt or deal with emergencies, is this not a sig-
nificant knock on the unbundled executive?'
The ability of institutional structures to incorporate changing cir-
cumstances is important, but there are two reasons the unbundled ex-
ecutive does not completely falter. First, throughout the discussion, we
have emphasized the optimality of partial unbundling. At no point was
it argued that perfect or complete unbundling would be desirable. Thus,
in the proposed regime, there is always what might be termed a residual
executive, an executive who has authority over all issues that have not
been unbundled. At the margin, this executive is still more accountable
than a single general purpose executive but less accountable than the
unbundled executives with control over a single policy domain.
When new policies or problems arise, the residual executive could
address them just as the current perfectly bundled executive does. This
is true of gradual change, but it is also true of more acute challenges
like emergencies. The unbundled executive is not debilitated when
emergency strikes, or at least is no more debilitated than the existing
bundled executive would be. In fact, because the residual executive
has fewer policy domains to manage, she is likely better able to re-
spond quickly and decisively when emergency strikes. The ability to
react to subtle or sudden changes in social circumstances is a value of
both the current and proposed regimes.
This response addresses the most severe concern about the un-
bundled executive and emergencies. But what if new issues emerge
that would best be unbundled or previously unbundled regimes wane
in importance? This problem has been faced by state and local gov-
ernments for many years. New elected offices are created with some
frequency in the United States. There are costs to doing so, but they
are not insurmountable. The structure of the executive branch has
changed enormously from the founding; today's cabinet level officers
106 Consider Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 Stan L
Rev 605 (2003) (criticizing two major arguments that oppose judicial deference to the executive
during times of emergency); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L J 1029
(2004) (proposing guidelines that could be incorporated into a statute to govern division of
powers during an emergency); Adrian Vermeule, Self-defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emer-
gency Powers, 75 Fordham L Rev 631 (2006) (critiquing Ackerman's proposed statute to adjust
the allocation of power during emergencies); Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies
and Democratic Failure, 92 Va L Rev 1091 (2006) (considering the relationship between demo-
cratic failure and emergencies and concluding that democratic failure is not more likely in times
of emergency than in other times).
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are not the same as those established early in our history. Although it
is somewhat rarer to eliminate offices than to create them, offices are
eliminated at all levels of government. As society changes, political
institutions do as well. If old unbundled executives should be elimi-
nated and new unbundled executives created, so be it. An easy solu-
tion is to accompany each executive election with an option to elimi-
nate the office entirely. These are real design questions, but they are
also third-order considerations. If the unbundled executive is to be
rejected, we doubt it will be on these grounds.
CONCLUSION
Our vision of the unbundled executive is preliminary, and per-
haps it is a singularly unlikely one as well. Still, unbundling executive
authority would seem to produce desirable effects on political institu-
tions in representative democracies." Although our proposal is more
in the spirit of a thought experiment than a true reform proposal,
reform movements in the states have long experimented with differ-
ent structures of executive authority, and constitutional theory might
benefit from some of these lessons." At a minimum, our work pro-
vides a counterweight to many wrong-headed assumptions in modern
constitutional theory about the relationship between singularity, cen-
tralization, the structure of executive authority, and electoral controls.
The unbundled executive project is mainly about constitutional possi-
bility rather than constitutional reality. We do not claim that the most
sensible or even any plausible reading of the US Constitution estab-
lishes a plural unbundled executive; but perhaps it should. To the ex-
tent the current constitutional structure would allow for modest ad-
justments toward the unbundled executive ideal, our work suggests
such reforms would produce a government structure more in keeping
with the democratic ideals most commonly said to justify the single
unitary executive. The plural executive position has long been lam-
pooned in constitutional theory. The unbundled executive suggests it
should be lampooned somewhat less.
107 See Marshall, 115 Yale L J at 2468 (cited in note 8) (noting the success of the divided
executive in state governments).
108 See generally Dye, 22 W Polit 0 926 (cited in note 84) (exploring the connection be-
tween institutional structure and public policy in state governments).
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TABLE 1
STATE GOVERNMENT ELECTED OFFICIALS, 1967-1992
1992 1987 1977 1967
Total 18,828 18,134 15,294 13,038
Members of state legislatures 7,461 7,461 7,562 7,613
Members of other elected boards 1,331 1,300 1,229 1,230
Other elected officials 10,036 9,373 6,503 4,195
Source: Census of Governments
TABLE 2
ELECTED OFFICES BY STATE, 1992 AND 1967
Members of
Members of other elected Other elected
Total legislatures boards officials
State 1992 1967 1992 1967 1992 1967 1992 1967
436 275 140 141
255 415 60 60
239 228 90 90
349 205 135 135
226 177 120 120
280 214 100 100
333 352 187 213
80 71 62 53
934 354 160 165
465 389 236 259
91 89 76 76
171 141 126 105
623 633 177 235
506 386 150 150
319 275 150 185
343 240 165 165
565 275 138 138
629 404 144 144
210 186 186 185
356 261 188 185
225 303 200 280
652 310 148 148
623 283 201 202
296 263 174 174
994 553 197 197
201 203 150 159
201 114 49 49
141 101 63 60
285 131
56 14
32 18
214 70
102 53
164 103
146 139
6 6
774 186
224 125
2 2
45 36
437 389
356 236
169 90
168 75
424 134
330 168
9 1
168 76
17 6
472 129
422 78
116 83
349 120
51 41
131 48
56 27
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Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
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Members of
Members of other elected
legislatures boards
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wvoming
1992 1967 1992 1967
430 430 424 424
121 90 120 89
220 173 112 112
950 417 211 207
593 284 170 170
205 181 159 146
231 202 132 132
362 250 149 147
290 156 90 90
1,200 464 253 253
155 155 150 150
195 198 170 174
155 147 105 110
321 257 132 132
815 534 181 181
200 140 104 97
186 186 180 180
143 143 140 140
537 452 147 148
205 175 134 134
450 193 132 133
121 111 94 91
1992 1967 1992 1967
Source: Book of the States
TABLE 3
ELECTED OFFICIALS PER CAPITA, BY STATE, 1992 AND 1967
State government Local government
Per 10,000 T Per 10,000
Total officials population Total officials population
State 1992 1967 1992 1967 1992 1967 1992 1967
18,828 13,038 0.76 0.67
436 275 1.08 0.78
255 415 4.64 15.26
239 228 0.65 1.41
349 205 1.48 1.05
226 177 0.08 0.09
280 214 0.85 1.08
333 352 1.01 1.22
80 71 1.20 1.39
493,830 508,720 19.9 26
3,949 3,785 9.8 10.8
1,674 557 30.4 20.5
3,050 1,949 8.3 12.1
8,059 10,084 34.3 51.6
18,699 18,079 6.3 9.6
8,325 6,478 25.3 32.8
8,814 10,509 26.8 36.6
1,091 800 16.4 15.6
2008] 1431
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Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
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State government Local government
Per 10,000 1 Per 10,000
Total officials population Total officials population
State
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
1992 1967 1992 1967 1 1992
0.60
0.87
1.24
2.03
0.59
0.78
1.00
1.07
0.86
1.12
1.89
0.72
0.56
0.37
0.79
1.13
1.23
2.89
0.78
2.22
6.31
0.13
1.69
0.23
0.57
2.78
0.20
1.02
0.80
0.40
1.73
0.77
2.16
0.66
0.50
1.39
4.59
0.32
1.52
1967 1992 1967
4,654 4,716
6,064 6,837
92 95
4,604 3,714
41,713 35,721
11,118 10,898
16,160 20,726
18,552 18,089
6,495 6,286
4,422 4,357
6,346 6,665
1,767 1,680
21,948 11,535
18,052 23,074
18,247 26,007
4,458 4,498
16,287 16,660
4,905 4,880
13,698 19,159
1,077 797
6,917 5,808
8,921 9,362
1,981 1,997
24,982 24,091
5,227 5,220
15,277 16,145
19,135 20,636
8,627 9,210
7,543 7,529
29,276 33,890
983 1,125
3,748 2,880
9,529 16,161
6,629 7,620
26,813 22,504
2,511 2,081
8,348 7,059
2,961 3,444
7,187 7,497
3.6 7.9
9.4 15.3
0.8 1.3
45.7 53.5
36.5 33.3
20.1 22.2
58.2 75.4
74.9 80.4
17.6 19.8
10.5 12.1
51.7 67.8
3.7 4.7
36.5 21.4
19.4 27.6
41.9 72.7
17.4 19.3
31.8 37
61.5 69.5
86.8 131.6
9 17.6
62.4 85.3
11.6 13.6
13.1 19.5
13.9 13.2
7.9 10.4
239.1 248.4
17.7 20
27.5 37.5
26.6 38.5
24.6 29.3
9.8 12.5
10.8 11.1
136.9 237
13.6 19.6
15.8 20.9
14.6 20.6
148.3 174.3
4.8 7.6
14.8 25.2
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State government Local government
Per 10,000 Per 10,000
Total officials population Total officials population
State 1992 1967 1992 1967 1992 1967 1992 1967
West Virginia 205 175 1.14 0.98 2,567 3,373 14.3 18.8
Wisconsin 450 193 0.92 0.46 17,379 20,165 35.5 48.5
Wyoming 121 111 2.67 3.37 2,621 2,288 57.7 69.5
Source: Book of the States
TABLE 4
INDEPENDENTLY ELECTED STATE OFFICES
Number of states
Office or function where elected
Governor
Lieutenant Governor
Attorney General
Treasurer
Secretary of State
2002 1977
50 50
45 41
43 42
38 39
38 37
Post-audit 19 17
Comptroller 16 9
Education 15 20
Pre-audit 15 12
Agriculture 12 11
Insurance 12 8
Public Utility Regulation 7 8
Community Affairs 6 0
Finance 5 0
Labor 4 4
Election Administration 4 0,
Revenue 2 1
Banking 2 0
Adjutant General 1 1
Natural Resources 1 1
Social Services 1 0
Transportation 0 1
Source: Book of the States
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TABLE 5
NUMBER OF INDEPENDENTLY ELECTED
EXECUTIVE OFFICES, BY STATE, 2002 AND 1977
State 2002 1977 State 2002 1977
7 7 Montana 7 6
3 2 Nebraska 6 7
7 5 Nevada 6 7
5 6 New Hampshire 1 1
10 8 New Jersey 1 1
5 5 New Mexico 7 6
6 7 New York 7 3
7 6 North Carolina 10 10
11 9 North Dakota 11 12
10 5 Ohio 8 6
2 2 Oklahoma 8 10
11 8 Oregon 8 6
8 8 Pennsylvania 6 4
8 8 Rhode Island 6 5
7 7 South Carolina 11 10
6 6 South Dakota 8 7
8 8 Tennessee 2 2
8 9 Texas 10 7
1 1 Utah 6 5
4 4 Vermont 7 6
6 6 Virginia 3 3
4 4 Washington 11 9
6 5 West Virginia 6 6
9 12 Wisconsin 6 5
6 6 Wyoming 9 4
Average 6.72 6.04
Source: Book of the States
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